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When the Daniel Arap Moi regime in Kenya reluctantly acceded to
the amendment of the Constitution to allow for multi-party politics in
1991,' many political observers and opposition groups believed that it was
indeed possible to effect change of government and institute democratic
governance through elections. The 1992 and 1997 elections proved them
wrong. Moi is still in power, and neither the increased number of players in
the political scene, nor the diminishing foreign aid allocations have shown
2the promise of ever tempering his dominance. And yet his regime
continues to stifle individual freedoms and rights,' fan ethnic indifferences,
attract blame for political murders,4 and worst of all, tolerate the plunder
of national resources for the benefit of a few through corruption and
tLecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi, Kenya; currently a research fellow at the
Danish Center for Human Rights, Copenhagen, Denmark; M.A., International Peace
Studies, University of Notre Dame; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., University
of Nairobi.
1. Section 2A of the Constitution, inserted therein nine years earlier in June 1982, had
turned Kenya into a dejure single party state. In December 1991, the Moi government
sponsored its removal and, thus, paved way for political pluralism. For a discussion of the
political developments after 1991, see DAVID W. THROUP & CHARLES HORNSBY, MULTI-
PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA: THE KENYATITA AND MOI STATES AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE
SYSTEM IN THE 1992 ELECTION (James Currey ed., 1998) [hereinafter MULTI-PARTY
POLITICS IN KENYA].
2. Moi Versus the Economy, AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, vol. 42, Sept., 2001, at 1.
3. Makau Mutua, Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in
Kenya, 23 HUM. RTs. Q. 96 (2001).
4. Gitau Warigi, Kenya's Long Hit List of Political Assassinations, DAILY NATION,
Mar. 5, 2000, at 6 (Nairobi).
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mismanagement. One of the factors to which the resilience of the regime
can be attributed, is its ability to manipulate ethnic cleavages to its
6
advantage, a tact that it undoubtedly learned from its predecessor. The
next general election is slated for December 2002. Though Moi has
• 7
announced that he will not seek re-election, the problems of ethnicity that
his regime has imprinted on the nation's political as well as socio-economic
life in his twenty-four year "mis"rule may, indeed, survive.
There is little doubt that the achievement of social, economic and
political goals in Kenya envisages the development of norms sensitive to
ethnic tolerance and cognition. In modern societies, the constitution is
regarded as the kingpin of normative development. Constitutional
engineering thus provides one avenue through which societal norms can be
inscribed, transformed, or altered. Analysts of Kenya's political scene,
though arguing from different standpoints, agree that the establishment of
norms that address all the ethnic cleavages is desirable. Ndegwa, for
example, observes that in the current stalemate, "democratic institutions
such as alternative electoral rules and constitution" should be redesigned
to incorporate issues of "rights and obligations."8 Conflicts, he argues, arise
from the dichotomized allegiance to state and culture, what he calls "dual
citizenship." According to him, federalism, consociationalism and electoral
engineering merely address the peripheral transitory problems arising
from "dual citizenship." Ajulu9 and Southhall"' are frustrated by Moi's
maneuvering of the ethnic equation to gain political mileage and, thus,
perpetuate his repressive leadership. They point toward the lack of norms
regulating political behavior as the reason behind the use of government as
"the driver of the accumulation process and the most important dispenser
5. Mburu Mwangi & Ken Opala, Moi's Son Among Top Names in Scam, DAILY
NATION, June 18, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi); see also Njeri Rugene, I Am Clean on Goldenberg
Scandal, Insists Saitoti, DAILY NATION, June 18, 1999 (Nairobi); President Denies Foreign
Account Claims, Threatens to Sue Publication, DAILY NATION, Nov. 23, 1999, at 1
(Nairobi).
6. See David W. Throup, The Construction and Deconstruction of the Kenyatta State,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KENYA 33-34 (Michael G. Schatzberg ed., 1987).
7. David Mugonyi & Maguta Kimemeia, It's Official, Moi Will Retire, DAILY NATION,
Oct. 21, 2001, at 1 (Nairobi); see also Bob Odhiambo, Moi Out, But Who In? NEW AFRICA,
Oct. 2001, at 13.
8. Stephen Ndegwa, Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition
Moments in Kenyan Politics, 91(3) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 599-615 (1977).
9. Rok Ajulu, Kenya's Democracy Experiment: The 1997 Elections, 25 REV. AFRICAN
POL. ECON. 275 (1997).
10. Roger Southall, Reforming the State? Kleptocracy and the Political Transition in
Kenya, 26 REv. AFRICAN POL. ECON. 93 (1999).
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of patronage and resources."1' The scholars agree that Kenya needs to
remodel its Constitution to reorder the societal structures so that they can
accommodate ethnic diversity. Ajulu, for example, asserts that Kenya's
Constitution is non-suited for this purpose. "In societies where political
power is highly contested along ethnic cleavages, an electoral system which
allows the winner on a minority vote to take all is simply a recipe for
disaster," he argues."
The Kenyan situation represent a real dilemma for those interested in
peace and stability in the continent. The fear that current contests between
the heavy-handed authoritarian regime and the unrelenting forces of
change may at one point lead to open conflagration is indeed well
founded. 13 The situation in neighboring nations of Somali14 and Sudan 5 has
done little to ameliorate these fears. The simmering tension amongst
ethnic groups, and the unpredictability of government in its response to
ethnic claims, has heightened the quest for the promulgation of a
constitutional regime that will guarantee equal political participation for
all ethnic groups.
In light of the impending constitutional review process," this article
examines how the ethnic question can be addressed through constitutional
engineering so as to eliminate the advantage that it has perennially
afforded to the political leadership since the country's inception. It will do
so by analyzing political developments since independence and their
impact upon the socio-economic conditions; isolating the landmarks of
ethnic contestations in the trajectory of competing forces in Kenya's
political history; reviewing the political developments toward constitu-
tional reform; and, finally, making a case for the establishment of strong
legal institutions as a basis for democratic consolidation.
11. Ajulu, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. Editorial, Avert Rising Threat of Ethnic Conflict, SUNDAY NATION, May 13, 2001, at
6 (Nairobi).
14. See generally Ismail I. Ahmed & Reginald Herbold Green, The Heritage of War and
State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-level Effects, External Interventions and
Reconstruction, 20(1) THIRD WORLD 0. 113-27 (1999); see also Osei Boateng, Somalia:
Beware of B-52 Bombers, NEW AFRICA, Jan. 2002.
15. See generally Laurence Juma, Regional Initiatives for Peace: Lessons from IGA D and
ECOWAS/ECOMOG, 40(3) AFRICA Q. 85 (2000).
16. Mugambi Kiai, Constitutional Review: New Potholes on the Road to Canaan, THE
LAW., vol. 35, July 2001, at 5 (Nairobi).
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II. COLONIALISM AND THE GENESIS OF ETHNO NATIONALISM
A. Pre-Colonial Societies
The present day Kenya is home to well over forty-two different ethnic
17groups. This classification may be somewhat arbitrary considering that it
amalgamates some groups that may be seen as separate. However, given
the complexity of ethnic and sub-ethnic groupings in the African context,
some arbitrariness may be excusable. The largest of the groups are the
Kikuyu (21%), who occupy the central part of Kenya, followed by the
Luhya (14%) and the Luo (13.5%) of western Kenya. There are also the
Kambas (11%), Kalenjins (11%), Merus (5%), Embus, and other smaller18
groups. Before colonialism, each of these groups existed in different
autonomous entities each identifying with distinct territory (homeland). 9
The homelands had cultural and economic significance. The common
characteristic amongst these groups was that life was simple and cultures
and religion were built around food, shelter, and the quest for security.
Ochieng has observed that:
[E]ach political system supported and was in turn supported by its own
form of religion and ritual. These rituals were applied to the consecra-
tion of accepted custom and authority, and to all those situations where
decisive change in custom and authority was found desirable or neces-
sary. That is why African religions have ... displayed ... a complete
• . 20
rounded explanation of life.
None of the groups practiced a single mode of subsistence. Though
one group may have been predominantly farmers, some members could
also be fishers, herders, or the like. Similarly, none of the groups had a
standard language. Instead, they had "clusters of dialects that shaded into
17. Recent census figures place Kenya's population at 28.7 million.
18. For a complete discussion of the Kenyan ethnic structure, see BETHWEL A. OGOT &
WILLIAM R. OCHIENG, DECOLONIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE IN KENYA 1904-93, (James
Currey ed., 1995).
19. One scholar has described Kenya's pre-colonial people as "like the American nation,
made up of strangers, both adventurers and refugees." H.G. Mwakyembe, The Parliament
and the Electoral Process, in THE STATE AND THE WORKING PEOPLE IN TANZANIA 32 (Issa
G. Shivji ed., 1986) Council for the Development of Social and Economic Research in
Africa (CODERSIA).
20. WILLIAM R. OCHIENO, A HISTORY OF KENYA 44 (1985).
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each other."2 They also had no unified line of patriarchal descent
22
traceable to one single origin.
Historians, lawyers, and political scientists alike are unable to agree
on whether pre-colonial societies in Kenya had a unified system of
government. Lonsdale argues that they did not, and thus categorizes them
as "ethnic groups" rather than "political tribes." 23 Ojwang acknowledges
that some ethnic groups had "a simple and relatively informal governmen-
tal system, localized and apparently not designed for a modern state.,
24
According to Olumwullah, the postulation that "Kenyan societies were
characterized by statelessness with only the Wanga Chiefdom having a
semblance of centralized political authority" is misleading because it is
informed by inaccurate understanding of how governmental power was
exercised in pre-colonial societies. 5 Taking on the examples of the Miji-
Kenda and the Kalenjin communities, he demonstrates that governmental
powers in these communities were exercised both at the vertical and
horizontal levels.26 He argues that among the Miji-Kenda, political
authority was exercised by Kambi, the highest level of leadership within
the Kaya (fortified villages of forested hilltops). It also discharged judicial
functions.2' As for the Kalenjin, he makes the following observation:
Notwithstanding this fluid social and political situation, it would be
wrong to describe the Kalenjin as a people lacking government or
structural organization. For, in their own way, and through an in-built
mechanism of recycling age-sets, these people maintained a highly
sophisticated system of government which ensured automatic continu-
ity .2 8
Despite the fact that the ethnic groups existed as political units, the
relationship between them was not necessarily in conflict. This by no
means suggests that these groups were totally egalitarian or that their
members enjoyed a homogenous culture with unambiguous identity.
21. John Lonsdale, The Political Culture of Kenya, Occasional Paper no. 7, in POLITICAL
CULTURE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS 91 (Int'l. Development Studies,
Univ. of Roskilde, Denmark, 1993).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 90.
24. J.B. OJWANG, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: INSTITUTIONAL
ADAPTATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE 21 (1990).
25. O.A.L.A. Olumwullah, Government, in THEMES IN KENYAN HISTORY 88-92
(William Ochieng ed., 1990).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 95.
28. Id.
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Indeed, there are studies which indicate that the pre-colonial African
societies were unstable, fluid, and much a factor of the vagaries of war,
famine, and internal competition." But this is only part of the wider
picture. In Kenya, the relationship between groups was influenced by the
interdependence in the realm of trade and material well being. For
example, the Mahiga traders led caravans over the Abardare hills to trade
various agricultural products for the Masai livestock." Ndege has given an
account about the elaborate trade patterns that existed before colonial-
ism." According to him, trade amongst the ethnic groups in western
Kenya, the Luo, Luhya, Abagusii, Abakuria, and even Abasuba was
widespread.32 Iron implements from Yimbo were traded amongst the Teso,
Bukhayo, Ugenya, and Bunyore up to Karachuonyo. Salt from Kaksingri
was distributed to almost all groups in the region. Similarly, the Kalenjins,
now occupying the Rift Valley, traded livestock for grains from the Luo
and other Bantu groups living in their proximity." Thus, so long as the
Kikuyu remained in the slopes of Mount Kerinyaga, the Masai in the
sprawling savannas of central lands, and the Luo at the shores of Lake
Victoria, conflicts were at a minimum. One scholar has aptly described the
relationship as that of "complimentarity" and "symbiotic interdepend-
ence."
34
B. The Colonial Rule
Through conquest,35 deliberate annexation of territory and lopsided
treaties,36 the British coalesced the ethnic groups and the minority settler
29. See, e.g., Bruce J. Berman, Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of
Uncivil Nationalism, 97 AFRICAN AFF. 305-11 (1998). According to the author, pre-colonial
African societies experienced great upheaval as a result of war, famine, and disease that
"destroyed old communities and identities, forced people to move and also created new
communities out of survivors and refugees, often linked in unequal and dependent
relations." Id.
30. CHRISTOPHER LEO, LAND AND CLASS IN KENYA 33 (1984),
31. See generally P. Ndege, Trade Since the Early Times, in THEMES IN KENYAN HISTORY
117 (William Ochieng ed., 1990).
32. Id. at 121.
33. Id.
34. Fredrik Barth, Introduction, in ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES 18-19 (Fredrik
Barth ed., 1970).
35. OJWANG, supra note 24, at 24.
36. 01 le Njogo, et al. v. Attorney General of East Africa Protectorate, 5 EAST AFRICA
L. REP. 70 (1914). This case, often referred to as the "Masai case," explains the nature of
the treaties made with the African groups. Here, the Colonial Administration, after
discovering that part of the Masai territory was conducive to agriculture, induced the Masai
Laibon (chief) to an agreement which provided inter alia that the agreement "shall be
[Vol. 9.2
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population into a Nation State. The British direct rule was established on
June 15, 1895, by the declaration of a protectorate status over the present
day Kenya. 7 The protection status conferred on the British the power to
exercise control over the indigenous groups and also acquire their land.
The process of acquiring territory through conquests benefited a great deal
from the British tactics of playing one African group against another and
rewarding their supporters with loot, mainly cattle, taken from the
conquered groups.38 The African "allies" also earned political increment
in British victories and sustained domination over internal opposition.
According to Atieno-Odhiambo, the African allies were the "first
generation of collaborators."39 They accumulated wealth (land, wives, new
kinship networks, clients, and chiefly power) and took advantage of the
same to establish their patrimony.40 For example, Nabongo Mumia of the
Wanga tribe, consolidated his authority against traditional opponents
while enjoying the British support.4' His kingdom provided "auxiliaries;
to the British army and assisted expeditions against the Luo and the
Kalenjins.42 Odera Ulalo, the great Luo chief of Gem, used British support
enduring so long as the Masai as a race shall exist and that European settlers shall not be
allowed to take up land in the settlements." Id. The agreement was abrogated when, after
seven years, the colonial administration forced the Masai to move from the settlement land.
An action brought on the grounds that the treaty was a binding contract for which breach
thereof should attract damages was dismissed by the colonial court.
37. Y.P. GHAI & J.P.W.B. McAUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA
3 (1970) [hereinafter GHAI & McAUSLAN]. The direct rule was preceded by the
interregnum of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEACO). The company was
chartered in 1888 to administer the so-called 'British sphere of influence' following the
Anglo-German Agreement of 1886. The significance of IBEACO's rule was that it created
administrative sub-divisions that were later adopted by the colonial administration. In the
words of John Ainsworth, the first colonial sub-provincial commissioner for Ukambani
region, the districts were "based on old sub-division of the IBEACO which left us both an
excellent foundation and framework of organization, and staff of very capable officers,
Europeans and native, well acquainted with the needs and capacities of their respective
districts." Olumwullah, supra note 25, at 99.
38. BRUCE BERMAN & JOHN LONSDALE, UNHAPPY VALLEY: CONFLICT IN KENYA &
AFRICA, BOOK 1: STATE AND CLASS 55 (James Currey ed., 1992) [hereinafter UNHAPPY
VALLEY].
39. E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo, Democracy and the Ideology of Order in Kenya, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KENYA 177-83 (Michael G. Schatzberg ed., 1987).
40. UNHAPPY VALLEY, supra note 38.
41. Id.; see also BRUCE BERMAN, CONTROL AND CRISIS IN COLONIAL KENYA: THE
DIALECTS OF DOMINATION 211 (1990) [hereinafter CONTROL & CRISIS IN COLONIAL
KENYA].
42. UNHAPPY VALLEY, supra note 38.
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to invade Ugenya and the Kalenjin to increase his wealth in cattle.43 In the
1890s, the Masai Olonana invaded the Nandi and other neighboring tribes
and achieved great victories in the Morijo civil war against the il aig-
wanak.44 The involvement of Africans in the British military action was
based on "mutually incompatible calculation of self interest., 45 As noted
by Bruce, the contradictions that emerged were solved by cooperation of
new allies and the "creation of new pivots of patronage at different levels
of the social system." 46 From the very onset of British occupation, the
deliberate manipulation of ethnic differences to acquire territory and
secure political support became part and parcel of the process of state
building.
Though the process of acquisition of territory had begun well before
the declaration of the protectorate status, judicial authority can be traced
back to the 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act which provided for the exercise
of jurisdiction by Her Majesty the Queen:
[O]f any jurisdiction, whether obtained by treaty, capitulation, grant,
usage, sufferance or any other lawful means, and whether obtained
before or after the commencement of the Act, in a foreign country in as
ample a manner as if she had acquired that jurisdiction by cessation or
47
conquest.
The authority herein conferred was gradually expanded to expedite
the complete subjugation of the natives and to open up the country for
settler occupation. The process was accomplished through the establish-
ment of administrative as well as legislative authority that was "subordi-
nate to the imperial government."48 Prior to 1897, the colonial officers in
Kenya exercised authority similar to their counterparts in India.4 9
However, the 1897 East African Order in Council brought in a structured
form of administrative authority with the Office of Commissioner being at
the helm. The commissioner had the responsibility of establishing
administration, maintenance of law and order, and exercising legislative
powers."' He was empowered to legislate on matters relating to internal
communication, security, observance of treaty obligations, matters of local
43. Id.
44. Id. at 27.
45. Id. at 55.
46. Id.
47. GHAI & McAUSLAN, supra note 37, at 15.
48. Id. at 35.
49. Id. This was done by virtue of the order issued by the Foreign office in 1896.
50. Id. at 37.
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laws and customs, and for the "good government of the Protectorate."'" In
exercise of his powers, the authority of the commissioner was not subject
to any person in the colony. He was accountable only to the Secretary of
State in England to whom he was to make annual reports on operations in
the colony. 2
As for judicial authority, the 1897 East African Order in Council
made provision for a legal system whose function was coterminous with
imperial interests and sympathetic to such an overbearing administrative
authority. This legislation created a tripartite court system comprised of
the native, Islamic and English courts-styled the colonial courts. 3 The
entire court system was placed under the supervision of the Privy Council
in Britain. The system changed in 1902 when, by virtue of an Order in
Council of that year, the High Court for the East Africa protectorate was
established, with appeals going to her Majesty's Court of Appeal for East
Africa.5 Apart from the judicial structure, the administrative mechanisms
in the colony were fragmented and merely reacted to the whims of the
settlers.
Coextensive with the exercise of state power was the institutionaliza-
tion of racial segregation. By and large, the ideological underpinnings that
informed the edifice of colonial administration were explicated by the
perception of the African as a "happy, thriftless, excitable person, lacking
in self-control, discipline, and foresight.5 6 This, no doubt, provided a
moral justification for the systematic and deliberate divestiture of land
from the ethnic groups and exacerbated exploitation. European occupa-
tion was perceived as something good for the African because the he was
inferior "not only in the sense of having a more rudimentary technology,
but in some kind of vaguely conceived absolute sense, which was thought
to have both intellectual and moral dimensions." 7 Leo summarizes the
spirit of European occupation as premised on "a self confident belief...
that could justify almost anything. 58
It is thus not surprising that in 1915 the colonial government passed
the Crown Lands Ordinance that divested the ownership of all land from
51. Id. This was provided for in article 45 of the E.A. Order in Council.
52. Id. at 38.
53. GHAI & McAUSLAN, supra note 37, at 130.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. LORD LUGARD, THE DUAL MANDATE IN BRITISH TROPICAL AFRICA 69 (5th ed.
Archon Books 1965).
57. LEO, supra note 30, at 34.
58. Id. at 35.
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the Natives and invested it in the Crown.59 In effect it abolished the rights
of Africans to land in the colony and made them tenants at will of the
Crown.0 Generally speaking, the purpose of this legislation was two-fold.
First, it ensured that all the fertile land, both suitable for agriculture and
ranching, were made available for white settlers. The divestiture was so
effective that by 1914 there were well over one thousand white farmers
61
occupying about four million acres of land. Secondly, it created a
situation where the natives would be landless and thus form a pool from
which cheap labor could be drawn. A systematic movement of Africans
from their ancestral land and subsequent settlement into designated areas,
notoriously called the "native reserves" was undertaken. 6' The natives
were thus confined into designated tribal reserves with clearly marked
boundaries. So as to "pacify" dissent and ease administration, the reserves
remained as a "castellation of ethnically exclusive districts that incorpo-
rated deeply rooted isolated and mutually antagonistic tribes."63  The
Kikuyu had their own reserves just like the Luo, Kamba and others.
Not only were ethnic boundaries 64 in the reserves clearly demarcated
and their inhabitants technically confined within their territories, but the
general life of the African was strictly controlled. Each reserve was under a
colonial appointed chief and headmen who ensured the maintenance of
law and order. They also collected taxes, especially the Hut tax,6 for the
59. No. 12 of 1915, sections 5, 54 and 56, quoted in GHAI & McAUSLAN, supra note 37,
at 27. The Crown Lands Ordinance defined Crown lands to include land held by the
different native tribes, and land reserved by the governor for the use of native tribes, but
"such reservation, shall not confer on any tribe or members of any tribe any right to
alienate the law so reserved or any part thereof." Id.
60. Id. at 28, 89. In the case of Wainaina v. Murito [(1923) 9(2) KLR 102], the Supreme
Court affirmed this position. Id.
61. P. Anyang Nyongo, The Possibilities and Historical Limitations of Import-
Substitution Industrialization in Kenya, in INDUSTRIALIZATION IN KENYA: IN SEARCH OF A
STRATEGY 12 (Peter Coughlin & Gerrishon K. Ikiara eds., 1988). At independence, the so-
called white highlands comprised of about three million hectare of land divided into 3,600
farms and ranches. LEO, supra note 30, at 4.
62. LEO, supra note 30, at 4.
63. HAUGARGERUD ANGELIQUE, THE CULTURE OF POLITICS IN MODERN KENYA 46
(Cambridge University Press 1995).
64. It is important to note that the boundaries were fixed at the whims of the settlers.
They could be moved or altered at any time to allow for the expansion of white settlement.
An example is often given of the 1913 edict that awarded the land between the Ambani and
the Chania rivers near Nyeri to the white settlers despite the 1912 demarcation. LEO, supra
note 30, at 38.




colonial authorities, and supervised the restrictions placed on commerce
and agriculture. They also ensured the provision of labor for communal
and public projects. 67 It is the heavy-handedness of these colonial chiefs
and their headmen, and the general hardship of life within the reserves
that drove most young people to seek work in the white farms or
employment in the metropolitan areas. 68 The young men who moved to
the white farms took residency there and became squatters.
The squatter phenomenon greatly influenced colonial policies and to
a large extent defined the nature of the relationship between races during
this time. As the number of squatters increased and their agricultural
output became significant, the colonial government introduced legislation
to keep them in check. The 1918 Resident Native Squatter Ordinance
primarily set the obligations and restrictions on squatter activity. It gave
the settlers tremendous power of supervision by introducing government
controlled labor contracts. These contracts ensured that the African could
reside in the white highlands in no other status other than that of a
squatter, "liable to eviction at the expiration of the respective labor
contracts."70  The purpose of this legislation has been summarized as
follows:
[T]o destroy the relationship of landlord and tenant between the Euro-
pean farmer and the African, and so to destroy any rights the African
might have in the land by reason of tenancy. A relationship of employer
and employee involving elements of involuntary servitude was substi-
tuted, and one of the prime objects.., was to ... prevent the develop-
71
ment of the system of tenancy.
A more vicious regime of squatter regulation came into place by the
passing of the 1937 Resident Native Laborers Ordinance.72 This legislation
devolved the powers for squatter management to the district councils
primarily controlled by the settlers. The legislation was a pointer toward
66. The total amount of taxes collected from the Africans in 1931 amounted to £530,877
as compared to £42,596 collected from the white settlers. Yet the per capita income of the
whites was about two hundred times higher than that of the Africans. CONTROL & CRISIS IN
COLONIAL KENYA, supra note 41, at 163.
67. KANOGO, supra note 65.
68. Id.
69. "Squatting" is a phenomenon that refers to the "access to land on settler estates for
cultivation and grazing in return for a stipulated period of labor service on the settler's farm
at a minimum wage." CONTROL & CRISIS IN COLONIAL KENYA, supra note 41, at 62.
70. LEO, supra note 30, at 43.
71. GHAI & McAUSLAN, supra note 37, at 83-84.
72. KANOGO, supra note 65, at 97.
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the wider government policy of gradually making the squatter populations
more dependent on wages rather than land. Though not officially backed
by direct sanctions, government policy espoused by the colonial Labor
Office during this period made squatter farming very difficult." The wage
labor economy resulted not only in the impoverishment of the unskilled
labor force, but also created a minority of high wage earners amongst the
Africans. This group was able to invest in land purchase, commodity
production and trade. In the reserves, a class of "rich" African farmers
emerged and was readily integrated into the capitalist economy. The
evolution of class difference amongst the Africans was accelerated by
deliberate government action. For example, under the Swynnerton Plan of
1954, the colonial government, hoping to introduce "modem" tenure in
the African reserves, allowed the "able, energetic or rich Africans to
acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less, creating a landed and a
landless class." 74 According to the government, the creation of the two
classes was "a normal step in the evolution of a country."75 Further, the
76government eased restrictions on African cash cropping.
Inter-ethnic relationships could not be explained only in terms of the
class differences. Obviously the existence of the squatter phenomenon in
the white highlands, the impoverished peasant population in the reserves,
and the "landed elite" exacerbated tensions amongst the Africans and
sharpened the differences within communities. But it is the attitude of the
colonial administrators that influenced economic policies, which, in turn,
favored some ethnic communities more than others. The ethnic groups
were treated differently depending on the attitude of the colonial
administrators based upon what was considered to be their propensity.
For example, the Luo were perceived as prudent civil servants,77 the
Kamba as generally "flexible and cooperative," 8 while the Kikuyu as
shrewd tradesmen. One colonial report stated:
73. Id. at 102. For example, the refusal of the government to allow the keeping of goats
by squatters in Naivasha area is mentioned herein. Id.
74. R.J.M. SWYNNERTON, A PLAN TO INTENSIFY THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN
AGRICULTURE IN KENYA (Govt. Printer, Nairobi 1954), quoted in Michael Chege, The
Political Economy of Agrarian Change in Central Kenya, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
KENYA 101 (Michael G. Schatzerberg ed., 1987).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Bethwel Ogot, British Administration in the Central Nyanza District of Kenya, 4 J.
AFRICAN HIST. 128 (1963).
78. Bismark & Myrick, Colonial Institutions and Kamba Reaction in Machakos District:
Destocking Issue 1930-1938 (Syracuse University Press, New York, 1975).
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[T]hough the African in Kenya has shown that he is anxious to partici-
pate in trade and industry... [h]is initial attempts in this direction have
not been successful, mainly because of his lack of experience in busi-
ness. I think that the Kikuyu are likely to realize the advantages more
quickly than others.79
One consequence of such stereotyping was the creation of ethnic
hierarchy and the sharpening of consciousness toward ethnic identity.80
Perhaps this explains why the Kikuyu, more than any other ethnic
community, were more readily integrated into the emergent capitalist
economy. And because of the proximity to the white highlands, a
significant portion of their population committed to the European way of
life and, thus, achieved the greatest social mobility. Other factors such as
landlessness and population growth motivated their mass movement to the
Nairobi cosmopolitan area to look for jobs. It is thus not surprising that
the Kikuyu were the first to agitate against the colonial state.
To the colonialists, the ability to cope with dissent depended on
"fragmented local containment of African political and economic sources
and their representation in state institutions according to their ethnic
categories."" The policy worked in so far as it decentralized dissent. The
ethnic groups were never able to ferment a national uprising against the
very unpopular land policies. Each group was on its own. The Mau Mau
revolt exemplifies this fact. Frank Furedi described the revolt as a
"squatter movement which emerged out of lengthy agrarian struggle
between Kikuyu squatters and the European settlers. 8 2 Leaving each
ethnic group to fend for itself created a deep sense of belonging and
affection amongst its members, which de-colonization with all its plausible
rhetoric of nationalism or democracy never erased.
The impact of colonialism in the ethno-political relations can be sum-
marized as follows: First, the boundaries created by colonial administra-
tion defied the primordial geographical structure of the Kenyan as well as
the other East African communities. Technically, the ethnic groups were
unified (in a very informal sense) in the state system. Second, the colonial
79. V.A. Madison, Schemes of Assistance to African Industrialists, Artisans and
Businessmen, Sept. 11, 1956, MCI/6/782, KNA quoted in DAVID HIMBARA, KENYAN
CAPITALISTS, THE STATE AND DEVELOPMENT 36 (1994).
80. Lonsdale, supra note 21, at 93. No wonder, according to Henry Mworia, the first
editor of the vernacular newspaper, Mumenyereri (Guardian), it was the Kikuyu who
needed democracy and not any other of the Kenyan ethnic groups. Id. at 96.
81. John Lonsdale & Bruce Berman, Coping With the Contradictions: The Development
of Colonial State in Kenya, 20 J. AFRICAN HIST. 505 (1979).
82. Frank Furcdi, The Social Composition of the Mau Mau Movements in the White
Highlands, 4 J. PEASANT STUD. 1 (1974).
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policy incorporated ethnic flavor in its administrative system. Thirdly, it
created a system of uneven development thus magnifying ethnic cleavages.
Finally, it encapsulated Christian religious tendencies by allowing
missionary activity to "pacify" the ethnic groups so as to ease political
domination. The interplay of these factors raised ethnic consciousness to
be part and parcel of Kenya's political life and has so persisted until today.
C. The "Ethnic" Factor in the Independence Movements
The initial phases of organized political mobilization were a function
of ethnic or sub-ethnic contests against local problems and a reaction
toward the unpopular British policy of indirect rule. The political agenda,
with which they were later associated, reflected, not the clear-cut
aspiration for an independent African state, but a localized opposition to
singular aspects of colonial policy or law. This was because of the
fragmentation of the African population. The colonial administration had
stabilized ethnic boundaries through the system of reserves thus limiting
the ability of Africans to forge a trans-ethnic political movement.
Similarly, the exclusion of African farmers from the market economy, by
denying them the opportunity to grow and market cash crops, further
hampered such movement."3 Instead, it perpetuated and strengthened
local loyalties. Secondly, the settler-dominated political scene offered little
room for the development of African politics. Abject poverty com-
pounded by lack of education, racial segregation, and diminished
communication capabilities, limited the functioning of African politicians
as national figures. From the beginning, African political activity in Kenya
was besieged by ethnic parochialism, a factor that not even independence
and all its plausible rhetoric of "Umoja na Nguvu" (unity is strength) has
been able to dislodge. Thirdly, there was a total lack of a shared discourse
or conceptual language of rights and obligations between the African
politicians.
Authors such as Frank Furedi,84 Bruce Berman,"' John Lonsdale," and
Tabitha Kanogo87 acknowledge that political activity amongst the Kikuyu
youths in and around the 1920s was a product of disaffection to the land
alienation policies, and was initiated by those who had some form of
missionary education. The Young Kikuyu Association (YKA) and the
Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) formed in 1920 and 1924 respectively,
83. Chege, supra note 74, at 100.
84. FRANK FUREDI, THE MAU MAO WAR IN PERSPECTIVE 76 (James Currey ed., 1989).
85. CONTROL & CRISIS IN COLONIAL KENYA, supra note 41, at 230.
86. Id.
87. KANOGO, supra note 65, at 106.
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championed the interests of Kikuyu culturalism that espoused anti-settler
sentiments and opposed Christianity-especially its teaching against
female circumcision. Because of the narrow focus, the Kenyan African
Union (KAU) and KCA never made inroads into the mainstream of anti
colonial politics of the time. They were dominated by the "petit-
bourgeoisie," had no plausible agenda to which popular support could be
anchored, and were bereft of any "coherent social programme."' 8 The
same fate also befell the North Kavirondo Central Association of the
Abaluhya of Western Kenya; the Ukamba Members Association (UMA);
and the Taita Hills Association (THA).89
The onset of the Mau Mau revolt in 1950 considerably changed the
political landscape. 1 The oathing ceremonies that the young Kikuyu
fighters underwent reinforced their sense of ethnic identity. But that said,
the revolt also revealed the difference between the elitist members of the
Kikuyu community who perceived themselves as above ethnic politics and
the lower rank and file whose motivation to fight off the European rested
on his seared economic condition. The elitist group (also the political party
leaders) detested Mau Mau methods. 9 The declaration of the state of
emergency on October 20, 1952, which resulted in large scale arrests and
detention of many Mau Mau activists,92 and the subsequent reprisal by the
colonial authorities may have limited the spread of the Mau Mau to other
ethnic groups in Kenya.93 However, its aftermath revealed that the colonial
establishment and the settler ideology that it professed could no longer
withstand the political challenge from majority Africans. As Furedi notes:
88. FUREDI, supra note 84, at 76.
89. North Kavirondo Central Association (NKCA) was formed in 1932 to protect the
interests of the local Abaluhyia communities who feared that the discovery of gold might
trigger a gold rush. It lost its appeal when gold prospecting stopped. D.N. Sifuna,
Nationalism and Decolonization, in THEMES IN KENYAN HISTORY 186, 189-96 (William R.
Ochieng ed., 1990). Ukambani Members Association (UMA) was formed in 1938 to
protest impending destocking decree. By this decree the colonial government intended to
take all the cattle from Ukambani as a supply to the meat factory at Athi River. Taita Hills
Association (THA) was formed to agitate for more land for the expanding Taita
population.
90. See generally FUREDI, supra note 84, at 76.
91. Id. at 113. Furedi quotes a remark by one KAU leader who said, "Mau Mau was
started by the ordinary people and when we leaders found out about it we were very
surprised. I didn't like people being forced to join an organization that they didn't want to
join." Id.
92. Id. at 118.
93. Id. at 143.
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Although the Mau Mau had been defeated militarily, the scale of the
resistance had shown that a European settlor-dominated Kenya was not
viable. It was clear that the existing form of state structure could not
guarantee stability; on the contrary it itself contributed to the build up
of tension and disaffection. 94
The 1957 elections, conducted under the Lyttelton constitutional
arrangements, formed a watershed in Kenya's political history.95 For the
first time, African members of the legislative council were elected through
popular vote. This reinvigorated claims by African politicians of more
African involvement in the political life of the country. The claims were
backed by boycotts and refusal to cooperate in the workings of a
government that did not respect the majority opinion." However, it was
not until 1960 when Kenyan National African Union (KANU) (currently
the ruling political party in Kenya) was formed that party politicking
emerged as a strong force in the movement toward independence. The
reason for this lies in the broad ethnic support that the party got from its
inception. African Nationalism was propagated instead of Kikuyu or Luo
nationalism, the narrow focus to which little appeal could be attached.
African nationalism could only be propagated within a territorial frame.
Geertz notes:
The first formative stage of nationalism consisted essentially of con-
fronting the dense semblage of cultural, local, and linguistic categories
of self identification and social loyalty that centuries of uninstructed
history had produced with a simple abstract, deliberately constructed
and almost painfully self conscious concept of political ethnicity-a
proper "nationality" in the modern manner ... The men who raised this
challenge, the nationalist intellectuals were thus launching a revelation
as much cultural, even epistemological as it was political.
97
Most importantly, KANU was supported by the Luo, a significant
population living in the western part of the country. The other ethnic
groups were suspicious of the Luo and Kikuyu domination and thus
formed Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) to function alongside
KANU. The difference between the two parties reflected their ethnic
composition. KADU's main fear was that KANU could use its demo-
graphic superiority to grab all the land left behind by the European
94. Id. at 161.
95. GHAI & MCAUSLAN, supra note 37, at 72.
96. Id. at 73.




settlers. They thus advocated for "decentralization of power so that power
is shared between many," a regional system of government. KANU on the
other hand supported the creation of a strong central government.
The contestation between the two parties is important to this dis-
course as it illustrates how resource competition engraved ethnic
affirmations just before independence. The Kikuyu aspirations favored
the centrality of land ownership and dismissed any historical claims.
"Land is so important to the economy of Kenya that it must ultimately be
98
under control of the central government," one Kikuyu elite argued.
According to him, digging back in "history in order to find which tribes
originally occupied this land or that, would only lead to unrest.99 What
mattered more was the economy of the situation.. 1°. At that time, KADU
leaders Daniel Arap Moi, Wafula Wabuge, and Ole Tipis refuted this
position on the grounds of unfairness. They argued that independence
should confer benefit to all. After independence, the political parties,
despite their differences, formed a coalition government. But, the polarity
of views, especially as regards issues of land and minority interests,
remained unsolved.
III. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND ITS AFTERMATH
Immediately after the collapse of colonial administration, two rather
confounding processes of social mobilization emerged. The first was the
claim to benefits of "uhuru" (independence) based on ethnic aggrandize-
ment, while the second was the overwhelming and euphoric support for
the establishment of African majority government, which was seen by
many as a triumph of nationalism. The two processes were important
because they influenced normative formulations at the very highest levels,
especially at the drafting stages of Kenya's independence constitution, and
later defined the contradictory political approaches to legal reform in
Kenya's post independence era. Be that as it may, there has never been an
open and clear acknowledgement of "ethnicity" or the differentiated
ethnic claim to political power, despite the same being a major influence
on political activity since independence. That is what makes the 1963
Majimbo Constitution a unique landmark in the trajectory of the legal
reform process in Kenya. The assertion by leaders, such as Daniel Arap
Moi, that their ethnic communities needed a political framework to
98. Margaret Wangui Gachihi, The Role of Kikuyu Women in the Mau Mau (1986)
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participate in government was remarkable and should have inspired a
much more articulate constitutional arrangement than it did. However,
the support that the majority of Kenyans gave to the KANU leadership
and the thought that civic nationalism could only be achieved if ethnicity
was eradicated, made nonsense of the minority claim. But today, Kenyans
are all too aware of what the forty-one years of KANU rule has done to
their country.
The Majimbo debate has recently surfaced again.'01 This time around,
the claim for Majimboism is touted as a warning to the Kikuyu opposition
conglomerate that unless they succumb to the demands of KANU, the
benefits of a unitary state may be unavailable to them even if they take
over leadership. It is thus noteworthy to examine some of the salient
features of the 1963 Majimbo Constitution because, after all, the
proponents of the idea are keen to infer to its existence. The 1962
Lancaster Conference and the subsequent meetings in Nairobi that
resulted in the adoption of the Constitution were bedeviled by claims for
recognition of minority interests. It was thus not a surprise that the 1963
self-government constitution recognized some form of Federalism-
Majimbo, to provide opportunity for minority groups to participate in
governance. The Constitution provided for the division of the country into
seven regions, each with a regional assembly vested with legislative as well
as executive powers. 02 Specifically, regional executive powers were to be
exercised by a committee of the Assembly known as the Finance and
Establishment Committee, but the Assembly was at liberty to delegate
specific duties to other committees)°3
The relationship between the centre and the regions was not clearly
spelled out. While the regions had powers to legislate on matters of
agriculture, archives, auction sales, primary and secondary education,
housing, medical, and others, the centre could also do the same.104
Secondly, the centre had the powers to intervene in matters within the
competence of the Regional Assembly. For example, under section 106(2)
of the Constitution, the central government could "give directions to the
101. See, e.g., Tread Carefully on Majimbo, SUNDAY NATION, Nov. 18,2001, at 11 (printed
by DAILY NATION, Nairobi).
102. GHAI & McAUSLAN, supra note 37, at 196. The Regional assembly was headed by a
civil secretary appointed by the public service commission, and was in charge of the
organization and the administration of civil service in the region. Kiraitu Murungi, The
Case of a Unitary State, EAST AFRICAN STANDARD, Dec. 9, 2001, at 13 (Nairobi).
103. GHAI & McAUSLAN, supra note 37, at 197.
104. The competence of the center was placed at the higher levels-higher education,
marketing, and export of agricultural products, but in practical terms, the jurisdiction
overlapped. Id. at 198.
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regional assembly as appeared to it necessary or expedient" so as to ensure
the compliance of the regional assembly.' This section provided that:
The executive authority of a Region shall be so exercised as ... (a) not
to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive authority of the
Government of Kenya; and (b) to ensure compliance with any provision
made by or under any Act of Parliament applying to that Region.106
According to Ghai and McAuslan, the regions had very little auton-
omy if any. °7 Their authority was precarious and could be impeded by the
central government at any time. Secondly, the Majimbo provisions were
rigid and complicated to the extent that they would have constrained
economic planning and development. 0 8 This was so because the country
did not have any "conventions for co-operation" between government and
other institutions.'0 9 In the end, the authors observe that:
It is important to remember that the regional structure was a new one,
and there had to be devolution of powers from the Centre before it
could begin to function. Thus it lacked a tradition of government, no
vested interests had yet been created, and the machinery for administra-
tion had to be established, often by transferring personnel from the
central establishment to the regional. Under the circumstances, the odds
against the success of the regional system were many and great.""
Despite its shortcomings, the Majimbo Constitution accommodated
the interests of all communities, the vocal and articulate as well as those
that Atieno-Odhiambo calls the "mute society.""' It also symbolized a
discontinuance from the past, an impetus toward autochthony, and most
importantly the attempt at harnessing the rich ethnic diversity toward
national development. It indicated a move toward multi-ethnic coalitions
that the country so much needed to deny any single ethnic community a
chance to dominate others simply on account of their numerical superior-
ity. When the strong KANU political elite overthrew the Majimbo
Constitution very soon after its adoption, the process of democratic
consolidation was obviated. It is for this reason that the independent
Kenya never achieved a complete break from social institutions that
105. Id.
106. Id. at 200.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 218.
109. GHAI & McAUSLAN, supra note 37, at 218.
110. Id. at 200-01.
111. Atieno-Odhiambo, supra note 39, at 179.
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characterized its colonial past. As observed by Lonsdale, "colonialism was
a social process that de-colonization continued."
' 2
A. The Rise of Kikuyu Nationalism
When Kenya attained independence in 1963 and Jomo Kenyatta
became President, he sought to accentuate Kikuyu hegemony. Studies
have shown that Kenyatta consolidated his leadership by increasing
members of his Kikuyu tribe both in the civil service and leading
government parastatals. For example, in 1969, 1974, and even 1979, thirty
percent of the cabinet members were Kikuyu."3 Likewise, the Kikuyu
private sectors were aided by the government. Scholars point to the
Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (GEMA) Holdings Limited which was
established in 1973 as one such enterprise.' 14 The so-called policy of
"Africanization" aided the entrenchment of Kikuyu capitalists into the
economy, while excluding other ethnic groups."' When it came to the
allocation of land, especially within the white highlands formerly occupied
by European settlers, the Kikuyu were given the utmost preference."' The
influx of the Kikuyu into Rift Valley, a predominantly Kalenjin area,
attracted opposition from local politicians at the time,"' and has over the
years been the subject of a great deal of contention between the two ethnic
groups.
Political perception prevalent within the other ethnic groups was that
of Kikuyu dominance. One Luo parliamentarian complained in Parlia-
ment that:
Today when we look at the top jobs in the government, we find that in
most of the ministries, including certain cooperatives, practically all
these have been taken over by people from central province (i.e., Ki-
kuyu). If one tribe alone can take over about seventy-two percent of
Kenya jobs, and they are less than two million people, how can you
112. John Lonsdale, The Depression and the Second World War in the Transformation of
Kenya, in AFRICA AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (David Killingray & Richard Rathbone
eds., 1986).
113. Throup, supra note 6, at 41.
114. NICOLA SWAINSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CO-OPERATIVE CAPITALISM IN KENYA
1918-1977 57 (Berkeley Univ. of California Press 1975).
115. DAVID HIMBARA, KENYAN CAPITALISTS, THE STATE AND DEVELOPMENT 33 (Lynne
Rienner Publishers 1994).
116. Nicholas Nyangira, Ethnicity, Class and Politics in Kenya, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF KENYA 15, 27 (Michael G. Schatzberg ed., 1987).
117. Id. at 29. The late Marie John Seroney, a Nandi politician, attracted ire from KANU
stalwarts in the late 1960s for spearheading the "Nandi Declaration" which called for
stoppage of land allocation to the Kikuyu. Id.
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expect twenty-five percent of the jobs to go to more than eight million
people who belong to other tribes."8
In order to eliminate opposition to his regime by other ethnic groups,
especially the Luo, Kenyatta outlawed opposition politics. When Oginga
Odinga, a maverick Luo politician resigned his post of Vice President in
the Kenyatta government and announced his intention to form the Kenya
Peoples Union (KPU), the government hurriedly changed the constitution
to require that MPs who seek to join the opposition party must first resign
their parliamentary seat and face re-election."1 9 Other than law, the
government resorted to political assassination to silence its critics. The
unexplained deaths of Argwengs Kodhek, J.M. Kariuki, Tom Mboya and
perhaps Ronald Ngala had all been accredited to the Kenyatta govern-
ment.20
Kenyans had fallen victim to Kikuyu sub-imperialism and just like its
colonial predecessor, the Kenyatta regime sterilized political activity of
other ethnic groups and silenced their voices. The exclusion of segments
of society from political and economic participation was promoted by the
strengthening of the central administration. Anyang Nyongo has
described this as the process of disintegration of national coalition that
brought independence. 121 By the time of his death in 1978, his tribes, men
and women, were virtually controlling all the sectors of the economy and
running all political institutions.
B. The Moi Era and the Politics of Ethnic Mobilization
The significance of the Moi regime to this discourse is two-fold. First,
events have occurred during this era that exemplify how ethnic mobiliza-
tion, coupled with a promise of tangible economic and political benefit,
may lead to inter-ethnic violence. It is during this regime that the
simmering discontent of the marginalized tribes, especially in the Rift
Valley and Coast province, have been aroused through political subterfuge
to justify a full scale inter-ethnic conflict. Second, and most surprisingly, it
is during this regime that political pluralism and the dreams for constitu-
tional reform have become a reality. The two rather contradictory
schemes of political action confirm just how fluid and susceptible the
118. G.F. Oduya, National Assembly Debates XIV, 6th Session, Feb. 27, 1968, quoted in
VICTOR OLURUNSOLA, THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL SUB-NATIONALISM IN AFRICA 22
(1972).
119. MULTI-PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA, supra note 1, at 13.
120. Throup, supra note 6, at 50.
121. P. Anyang Nyongo, Political Instability and Prospects of Democracy in Africa, 13(1)
AFRICA DEV. 72 (1988).
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regime has been. Marked with a wavery approach to national issues and
tethering support from ethnic lords, the regime has survived some of the
most difficult times in Kenya's history-the attempted military coup in122 / 123
August 1982, ' the murder of John Robert Ouk1o, and the withdrawal of
support from international donors,124 to mention but a few.
From the day Moi took leadership, his ability to maneuver the ethnic
equation to his benefit has not been in doubt. When he came to power, he
proclaimed that he would follow the footsteps of his predecessor,
Kenyatta, so as to gain support from the Kikuyu. Having come to power
amidst international economic changes that reduced real income levels of
Kenyans, the Moi clique did not have an economic base upon which to
anchor the ethnic political domination. Almost immediately he embarked
on the systematic replacement of Kikuyu in high positions, by members of
his Kalenjin tribe. Like his predecessor, Moi did not tolerate any form of
dissent to his authoritarian rule. Arbitrary arrests and detention of1ayes25 _ 126
lawyers, academicians, politicians and all other persons deemed to be
in opposition was commonplace. The aura of authoritarianism created an
atmosphere where Kikuyu hegemony could easily be replaced with
Kalenjin autocracy. To the extent that the regime was forced to reckon
with claims for political pluralism, the "Kalenjin" autocracy may have
much more to deal with before they can assume complete control of
Kenya's economic as well political institutions, like the Kikuyu did in the
1960s and 1970s.
C. The Return of Multi-Party Politics
At the beginning of the last decade, the regime came under very
severe opposition from the local NGO community, religious groups, and
professionals.127 These groups agitated for the reintroduction of multi-
party politics. The government insisted that Kenyans were not ready for
multi-partyism because it was divisive and a plot to reinstate the Kikuyu
hegemony since "all President Moi's critics were Kikuyu."''2 Pressure
122. MULTI-PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA, supra note 1, at 31.
123. Id. at 58-60.
124. Id. at 84-86.
125. Stanley D. Ross, The Rule of Law and Lawyers in Kenya, 30 J. MOD. AFRICAN STUD.
421, 422 (1992); PAUL MWANGI, THE BLACK LAW: CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL INTRIGUE
WITHIN KENYA'S LEGAL FRATERNITY 154 (2001).
126. Korwa Gombe Adar, Human Rights and Academic Freedom in Kenya's Public
Universities: The Case of the University Academic Staff Union, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 179 (1999).
127. MULTI-PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA, supra note 1, at 55-58.
128. Id. at 63.
[Vol. 9.2
ETHNIC POLITICS
mounted from internal as well as external forces. The international donor
agencies exacerbated strain on the Moi regime to accommodate opposition
groups. 9 At the same, time the opposition politicians backed by a
powerful civil society movement, the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) and
church groups threatened mass action and complete disruption of public
activity unless reform was undertaken. In July 1990, the government acted
swiftly to detain Matiba, Rubia and Odinga who were seen as the leaders
of the more militant wing of the pro-reform movement. The detention
was followed by the formation of what the KANU leaders termed a
commission to investigate the party's electoral and disciplinary proce-
dures. 3' George Saitoti, the Vice President, headed the commission. Its
members were Shariff Nassir, Biwot, Mwangale, Oloo Aringo, Kibaki,
John Keen, trade unionists, women representatives, lawyers and churchS • 132
organizations. The commission went round the country collecting views
of the public but was stunned at how the KANU government enjoyed very
little support. Speakers to the commission's forum "questioned the
continuation of the single party state" and "proposed a two term limit for
the presidency." ' As it became evident that the narrow one party
political arena could not withstand the pressure, Moi hurriedly changed
the Constitution to allow for multi-partyism in 1991.34
It is the political developments after the amendment of the constitu-
tion that illustrates how ethnic equation became vulnerable to Moi's
manipulative tactics. Though preceded by political euphoria in the form of
street demonstrations and civil society agitation, the change took the
political groups by surprise. The ethnic groups unfavored by the Moi
regime hurriedly and disjointedly formed political parties.1 15 The Luo and
129. In November 1991, western public donors withheld more than $350 million in aid to
Kenya (including $28 million from the U.S.) pending economic and social reforms.
130. MULTI-PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA, supra note 1, at 63.
131. Id. at 68 quoting WKLY. REV., July 6,1990, at 9-10.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. The announcement for the change was surprisingly made at the KANU delegates
meeting in December 1990. Though called primarily to debate the report of the Saitoti
Commission, many speakers at the conference opposed the move to pluralism, with some
even declaring that legalizing opposition parties would be akin to introducing chaos in the
country. "The choice," according to KANU's Organizing Secretary, "was between KANU
and violence." WKLY. REV. Dec. 6, 1991, at 5. After all the debate, the president announced
that section 2(a) of the constitution would be repealed and multi-party politics introduced;
a move that was supported unanimously by the delegates (even those who had voiced
opposition earlier).
135. For a discussion of how the parties were formed, see generally MULTI-PARTY
POLITICS IN KENYA, supra note 1.
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the Luhya, joined by a minority of Kikuyu "young turks," formed the
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD)-party which later split
into FORD Kenya and FORD Asili, the later being predominantly Kikuyu
and headed by Kenneth Matiba after his return from hospitalization in
London, and the former remaining a Luo and Luhya party. Another party
formed by the Luos was the National Democratic Party of Kenya (NDPK)
of Stephen Omondi Oludhe. 1 ' The Kalenjin tribes in the Rift Valley, large
sections of the Eastern, North Eastern and Coast provinces, were firmly in
support of the ruling party KANU. The announcement that multi-
partyism would be allowed aroused considerable excitement within Kanu
itself. Moderates in the party, who had hitherto supported reforms,
sensing that their party was relenting on its promise, opted out to join
other parties or form new ones. For example, Mwai Kibaki, the then
minister for health, resigned and formed the Democratic Party (DP).13 7
The support of this party was drawn mainly from the Kikuyu, Meru, Embu
(the old GEMA alliance) and some parts of Kambaland. The Kissi had
their Kenya National Congress led by George Anyona.
It is important to note that prior to this development, the Moi regime
had used all means possible to suppress people's freedoms. The entire civil
society and opposition groups could only think "negatively" of what they
opposed. They were thus never oriented toward the devolution of
concrete political agenda, other than ethnic allegiance, in support of which
they could rally. The opposition parties thus became by their composition,
representative of the major Kenyan tribes. This development changed
Kenya's political landscape by arousing ethnic consciousness to the
contestation for political leadership. It also embodied a real challenge to
the incumbent regime.
D. Ethnic Cleansing: A Political Tactic?
What the post-independence history of Kenya has shown is that when
a repressive and autocratic incumbency in a multi-ethnic state is threat-
ened by reforms, it falls back to its ethnic sympathizers for political
support. This retreat often triggers ethnic friction and animosity and is
perhaps responsible for the intractable conflicts currently plaguing the
continent. Just before the constitutional amendment allowing for multi-
partyism, Moi had in a number of occasions castigated the proponents of
136. This party was to become significant later, in 1998, after the fallout between the Luo
and the Luhya ethnic groups in the FORD(K). The Luo, led by Raila Odinga moved out to




multi-party politics as "anarchists and "tribalists. '138 Secondly, the regime
had always been aware of minimal support from the majority ethnic
groups, whose votes combined had the potential of dislodging it from
power. Moi had no option but to fall back to his Kalenjin group for
support. From a political standpoint, this was realistic approach given that
in total, the Kalenjin tribes accounted for twenty-six constituencies, which
under Kenya's electoral system meant the same number of seats in
parliament. But because the Kalenjin total support was doubtful, as Moi is
from a minority Sub-tribe (Tugen), he made appeal to ethnic identity.
Through his Kalenjin ministers and party leaders, a vigorous campaign was
made to unify the Kalenjins. The Kalenjin groups were urged to support
Moi and his party, KANU. A call for reclamation of land that had taken
by aliens became the rallying cry against all non-Kalenjin residents in the
Rift Valley province. The hatred that the land question was able to
generate within a short period of time is indicative of poor policies on
resource distribution pursued by the successive government since
independence. The Moi regime and the Kalenjin die-hards were
presenting to their folk an opportunity for correcting the "wrongs" that
had been committed against them in exchange for their votes.
Attacks on non-Kalenjin residents in Rift Valley began in 1991 after
declaration by Kalenjin politicians that people from other ethnic groups
were not welcome there. The killings were done by chopping heads, limbs
and genitals in a ritualistic fashion. The women were raped, their breasts
cut and bellies opened up to determine if they were pregnant. The
brutality with which these atrocities were conducted seems to suggest that
a clear message of terror was being passed to the non-Kalenjin communi-
ties. 139 The victims were supposed anticipate the horrific consequences
that would befall them if Moi was removed from power. Violence soon
spread to the other parts of the country. Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups
were generally displaced, and their demographic composition greatly
altered. According to one scholar, the ethnic cleansing "worked a political
miracle for the regime" because they "helped unite fractious Kalenjin sub-
groups while 'opening up' land that would be taken over by some Kalenjin
and driving likely opposition voters out of Rift Valley constituencies. "1
Government complicity was apparent, despite denial and inaction.
138. See generally MULTI-PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA, supra note 1.
139. This author personally witnessed the wanton destruction of his farm near Mateitei in
the Nandi district. His farm worker was hacked to death with a machete, while the farm
animals were herded into the shade and burnt to ashes.
140. Frank Homquist & Michael Ford, Stalling Political Change: Moi's Way in Kenya, in
CURRENT HIST., Apr. 1995, at 177.
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According to the Human Rights Watch Report published in 1993, the
prediction of Moi, that multi-partyism would bring ethnic animosity, was
fulfilled .' However, the report also observed that:
[F]ar from being the spontaneous result of a return to political plural-
ism, there is clear evidence that the government was involved in provok-
ing this ethnic violence for political purposes and has taken no adequate
steps to prevent it from sprawling out of control.'42
One Luo member of parliament vehemently protested the government's
inaction in parliament and put the blame squarely on his Kalenjin
counterpart. He removed his shoes in parliament and banged them on the
table saying:
You are killing my people.. . I don't want murderers to interrupt me on
a point of order ... my people are being killed by KANU ... and the
police and the provincial administration in Rift Valley just watch when
my people are being killed ... If the Kalenjin continue behaving this
way we will go beyond Kericho. 43
Thus, when the elections were held on December 1992, Moi won with
a majority of seats.'44 The outcome of the 1992 elections affirmed the
primacy of ethnicity in Kenya's politics. As observed by one writer:
The events of 1992-94 clearly demonstrated the primacy of individuals
and of ethnicity over policy ideology and class, though the ethnic identi-
fication revealed was more a rational reflection of economic self-
interest than some 'traditional' pattern of political orientation. The
previous 30 years of neo-patrimonial ethnic and regional clientage have
created an enduring culture of sectional competition for power and for
the goods that fundamental principle remained-that the competition
141. See generally Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya, HUM. RTS.
WATCH, Nov. 1993, at 1, 3.
142. Id. at 1.
143. WKLY. REV., Mar. 27, 1992. This Newspaper also reported that another Luo cabinet
minister, defying the joint accountability rule, asked his fellow cabinet minister (a Kalenjin)
to "withdraw his army from the battlefield" before he could talk in parliament about peace.
Id.
144. The total number of political parties that participated in the elections was ten.
KANU won the presidential seat with a total of 1,962,866 votes; followed by FORD(A) of
Kenneth Matiba 1,404,266; DP of Mwai Kibaki 1,050,617; and FORD(K) of Jaramogi
Oginga Odinga 944,197. MULTI-PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA supra note 1, at 435. As far as
parliamentary seats were concerned, KANU had 100, FORD(K) 31, FORD(A) 31, DP 23,
KNC 1, KSC 1, and PICK 1. Id. at 443.
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for power would be fought between ethnic coalitions built around
powerful individuals."
45
After the 1992 elections, many observers thought that the violence
would end. But this was not to be so. The ethnic violence erupted again in
1994. Human Rights Watch documented the displacement of approxi-
mately 4,000 Kikuyus from Trans-Mara in Narok district; 2,000 Luo
residents in Kilifi district, and serious skirmishes in the Burn-Forest area in
Rift Valley.146 The same violence occurred again just before the 1997
general elections and continues today in a sporadic fashion."'
It seems that the ghost of ethnic violence is yet to be exorcised. A
parliamentary committee appointed in September 1992 (Kiliku Commis-
sion) to investigate the conflict, found that political motivation from
KANU politicians was the cause. In June 1998, Moi appointed a judicial
commission of inquiry to investigate the "truth" about the ethnic
violence. '9 In Moi's own words, "In my search for peace, I want a judicial
commission of inquiry into what happened in 1992 and 1998 in Rift Valley
and other parts of the country.', 4 9 After a series of hearings in which the
commission heard evidence from victims and political leaders, a report was
prepared and submitted to the government. The report has not been made
public despite demands form various sections of society.
150
The fact that ethnicity is a tool for political machinations often pro-
vides it with the opprobrious label linking it to war and upheaval. The Moi
era has illustrated that until ethnic sentiments are deliberately invoked and
materially supported by a cognitive political constituency, ethnic pluralism
is not a threat to democracy.
145. MULTI -PARTY POLITICS IN KENYA, supra note 1, at 591.
146. Multi-Partyism Betrayed in Kenya: Continuing Rural Violence and Restriction of
Freedom of Speech and Assembly, HUM. RTS. WATCH 4-8 (July 1994).
147. See, e.g., David Mugonyi, NCCK Report Blames Politicians for Feuds, DAILY
NATION, June 27, 2001, at 4 (Nairobi); see also KANU Dismishes Clashes Report, DAILY
NATION, June 28,2001, at 6 (Nairobi).
148. Gichuru Njihia, Judges to Probe Ethnic Clashes, DAILY NATION, July 1, 1998, at 2
(Nairobi).
149. Id. Justice Akilano Akiwumi of the Court of Appeals was appointed to head the
commission. Other commissioners included Justices Elkana Bosire and Sarah Ondeyo.
Caleb Atemi, Akiwumi Heads Clashes Probe, DAILY NATION, July 2, 1998, at 1 (Nairobi).
150. Francis Thoya, Lawyers Demand Akiwumi Report, DAILY NATION, Feb. 21, 2000, at
11 (Nairobi); see also Dennis Onyango, Akiwumi Report and the Scars of Violence, SUNDAY
NATION, Mar. 18,2001 (printed by DAILY NATION, Nairobi).
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IV. COPING WITH ETHNIC DIVERSITY
A. De-Mystifying Ethnicity
It has become nearly impossible to discuss devolution of political
power in African countries without considering their ethnic configuration.
The talk on whether this "tribe" may lose power to that "tribe" or that this
"tribe" may retain power because it has the support of those "tribes" has
become so commonplace that no presidential election in Africa can now beS • 151
said to be devoid of ethnic considerations. Lack of ideological
commitments has, in whole, given way to concerted appeal for ethnic
support. Thus, African multi-party elections have been reduced to mere
census for ethnicities in the country. Ethnic identities in African party
politics are, according to one analyst, "prior, indigenous, and totalizing,
while nation-states are recent, imposed and superficial."' 52  Thus when
something goes wrong, be it as a result of the improper management of the
election process itself, or the abrogation of rights of one community by
government, ethnic alliances are quickly formed to provide a rallying
ideology for violence. If response from the government is slanted in favor
of one ethnic group, a major national catastrophe is likely to occur. The
Rwandan genocide, Sudan civil war, Somalia, and even the intractable civil
war in Angola, offer very lucid examples of the vulnerability of a state to
the manipulation of the ethnic psyche. 153 Even in cases where outright
violence seems unlikely because of strong government, the preponderance
of ethnically motivated political action on the part of power wielders may
accentuate hatred amongst groups and thus propagate a fertile ground for
future violence.
There is no consensus amongst scientists as to why ethnicity, and not
anything else, is a preferred rallying ground for political action. Factors
that include search for emotional security, circumstances of people's lives
and rational grounds of utility in the search for access to resources, have all
151. Deborah Kaspin, Tribes, Regions and Regionalism in Democratic Malawi, in
ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 464 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kaymlicka eds., 1997). Political
competition between the Xhosa and the Zulus nearly derailed South Africa's first
democratic elections. The 1994 multi-party elections in Malawi exposed tribal divisions in
the country with President Bakili Muluzi, a Yao from South claiming Yao constituency;
Hastings Banda, a Chewa from the centre, claiming a Chewa constituency; and Chakufwa
Chihana, a Timbuga from the north claiming a Timbuga constituency. Id. at 466.
152. Id. at 464.
153. Laurence Juma, Human Rights Approaches to Peace in Sierra Leone: The Analysis of
the Peace Process and Human Rights Enforcement in a Civil War Situation, 10 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y (2002) (forthcoming).
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been mentioned.114 David Brown has observed that ethnicity is preferable
because it benefits from the three factors. He argues that ethnicity
replicates "in the public and adult world, the functions performed in
private and childhood environment by family." '156 The ethnic group is seen
by its members as:
[A] [p]seudo-kinship group which promises to provide the all-
embracing emotional security offered by the family to the child; which
offers practical support, in the form of nepotism, such as the family
gives to its members when they interact with others; and which, pre-
cisely because it is based in ubiquitous family and kinship ties, is widely
and easily available for utilization in politics.
5 7
Ethnicity in Kenya, just like in many African countries, has defied the
popularly held view of the last century, that ethnic identities must and will
158fade away to be replaced by a less threatening civic nationalism. The
view, espoused by the independence fathers, accommodated their pursuit
of power and blinded the unsuspecting public of the kleptocracy,
indigenous spoliation, and the subterfuge with which ethnic affirmations
became part and parcel of their rule. The results have been far-reaching.
Political competition has become dependant solely on an ethnic power
game that pits the larger tribes against one another, and subsumes the
smaller ones in an intractable search for lucrative alliance. Economic well-
being and sharing of the national "cake" has been slanted to benefit those
ethnic groups that favor the ruling elite and so are the appointments to big
jobs in the civil service and government-sponsored parastatals.
What then is the best strategy of coping with ethnic diversity in
Kenya? To begin with, Kenyans must accept that ethnicity is not in itself a
bad thing. The fact of being a Kikuyu, Luo, Maasai or Luhya, to name a
few, does not in itself indicate difference in political opinion. Sociological
factors intervene to influence one's worldview. I have observed elsewhere
that all societies take great pride in aspects of their culture such as food
and dressing. 159 Further some scholars confirm that ethnic diversity in
154. David Brown, Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on State and Society, 11(4) THIRD WORLD
Q. 1, 6 (1989).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 6-7.
158. Interestingly, this view supports the Marxist socialist theories, which equates ethnic
conflict to immature class conflicts and anticipates the dissolution of ethnic identities in
class identities.
159. Juma, supra note 153.
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itself may not impede democratization. There should thus be a greater
willingness to accept "cultural pluralism" as a positive phenomenon.
61
The trend in Kenya that exhibits a tendency to play down the importance
of ethnicity and to devise institutions that would minimize its impact has
161failed. While ethnicity remains a forbidden topic in many arenas, and
ethnic loyalties are erroneously perceived as fissiparous, national
integration does not seem to gain ascendancy either. Thus, if truth be told,
many African countries, Kenya included, appear to be incapable of finding
ethnic modus vivendi, and a modicum of stability in unitary systems that
ignore ethnic divisions.
I propose therefore, that an appropriate conceptual base for designing
mechanisms of addressing the problems posed by ethnicity is that of
"positive ethnicity." It is based on the notion that societal integration is
best achieved through accommodation rather than by imposition. We can
cope with ethnic diversity if we concentrate on its positive dimensions and
work toward a policy of cultural pluralism rather than on suppression of
diverse ethnic identities. Two factors underlie the evolution of such
strategy. The first is that ethnicity in Kenya has proved to be disruptive of
political structures only when these have sought to suppress the competing
claims of ethnic groups for a share in political power and economic
advantage, as well as for cultural expression. Second, that ethnicity needs
to be acknowledged rather than ignored, through arrangements that
induce inclusionary politics and creates structural incentives for inter-
. 163
communal cooperation.
Positive ethnicity thus presupposes that the processes of ethnic inter-
action within a state are conceptualized as a shared culture of heritage, and
a strategy for the achievement of economic, social, and political objectives.
The two processes, which reflect both substantive and instrumental
160. H. Glickman, Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa, quoted in Zeric Kay
Smith, The Impact of Political Liberalization in Ethnic Conflict in Africa: An Empirical Test
of Common Assumptions, 38 J. MOD. AFRICAN STUD. 21, 22 (2000).
161. European Institutions such as Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
and the Council for Europe have, for example, developed guidelines for multi-ethnic
countries on how to protect rights of the minority ethnic groups through legislation and
autonomous local government. See generally MARINA OTTAWAY, DEMOCRATIZATION AND
ETHNIC NATIONALISM: AFRICAN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES (Kathleen Lynch
ed., Washington, D.C., Overseas Development Council 1994).
162. The Kampala Declaration of 1991 explicitly rejected ethnicity, stating that political
parties based on ethnic identities were not legitimate. The African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights (The Banjul Charter) avoided mention of ethnic groups and instead used
"peoples" as constituent members of society.




approaches, are not to be confounded. As people generate new responses
to changed circumstances and bestow new meanings and weights on
different aspects of their ethnic identity, these redefinitions guide further
social and political behavior. The generative process and its inherent
dynamism must be perceived as an asset, rather than a liability if the
process is to have meaning.164 The role of the state becomes crucial to this
endeavor. As already illustrated in this article, imperialism gave rise to the
exploitative authoritarian state that was obsessed with its civilizing role
and was even seen by some as the protector. Nationalism has brought into
being "soft" (democratic) or "hard" (dictatorial) regimes that have sought
to "modernize" people in different ways. I argue that the state can now
assume a different role. It can become a "negotiating table" or a
"mediator," its ideological concerns notwithstanding. In the words of one
scholar, the state may be conceived of:
[A]s an arena where social relationships can be renegotiated. The state
in this image is delimited-the image has obviously something to do
with the frequently observed marginality of organized politics... It is
seen as a kind of market place.
The state can only act if it is so mandated by its constitutive instru-
ment, the constitution. Which brings me to the point this article seeks to
make: the problem of ethnicity in Kenya can and should be addressed by
constitutional reform. This nevertheless implies that the pragmatic
approach to constitutionalism now envisages the widening of the concept
to include processes that ensure harmony in a multi-ethnic environment.
B. Constitutionalism
In Kenya, the quest for constitutional change has been aimed at rede-
fining the extent of executive power and widening the parameters for the
exercise of individual rights and freedoms. Indeed, this is what constitu-
tionalism is all about-the establishment of a government that is "subject
to restraint in the interest of the ordinary members of the community,
'66
164. This reasoning is not new. In analyzing the Indian situation with regard to the
language, religion and political diversity, Paul Brass noted: "Objective differences between
peoples are not only insufficient as basis of national formation but they are themselves
highly variable. Especially in traditional societies in the early stages of social mobilization,
it is misleading to think of gross differences in the religious and linguistic composition
populations as givens or as immutably fixed." PAUL BRASS, LANGUAGE RELIGION AND
POLITICS IN NORTH INDIA 12 (Vikas 1975).
165. Ashis Nandy, The State of the State, 269 SEMINAR 56-57 (1982).
166. OJWANG, supra note 24, at 2.
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and the institution of an elaborate scheme of human rights guarantees and
protection. Professor S.A. de Smith defines it as:
The principle that the exercise of political power shall be bounded by
rules which determine the validity of legislative and executive action by
prescribing the procedure according to which it must be performed or
by delimiting its permissible content ... constitutionalism becomes a
living reality to the extent that these rules curb the arbitrariness of
discretion and are in fact observed by the wielders of political power,
and to the extent that within the forbidden zones upon which authority
may not trespass there is significant room for the enjoyment of individ-
ual liberty.167
Constitutionalism emerged in Europe during the bourgeoisie revolutions
in the 17th and 18th centuries. 168 Its roots lie in the need of capitalism for
"predictability, calculability and security of property rights and transac-
tions. ,169 Though the origin of the term had little to do with democracy,
political freedoms or social justice, the concept has broadened over the
years to become a key factor in the analysis of constitutional and
democratic performance of governments.
The twin principles of separation of powers and the independence of
the judiciary are an outgrowth of constitutionalism. As conceived by
Montesque, the principle of separation of powers evolves out of the
realization that "every man invested with power is liable to abuse it, and to
carry his authority as far as it will go. '170 It becomes necessary that a
system of checks and balances is created to keep the government in
check. 7 ' This is done through the creation of the three arms of govern-
ment, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary."' Ideally, the three
167. S.A. de Smith, Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth Today, 4 MALAYA L. REV.
205-17 (1962) quoted in Welshman Ncube, Constitutionalism and Human Rights; Challenges
of Democracy, in THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 2
(Pearson Nherere & Marina Engelbronner-Kolff eds., Nordic Human Rights Publications
1993).
168. See generally Yash Ghai, The Rule of Law in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of
Constitutionalism (1990) (paper presented at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway, as part
of the commemoration of the 175th anniversary of the Norwegian Constitution.).
169. Id. at 2.
170. OJWANG, supra note 24, at 21.
171. Id.
172. The U.S. Constitution of 1876 is probably the best illustration of this principle. In
practice, the exercise of legislative functions could be widespread among the three arms of
government. John Locke has observed: "And because it may be too great a temptation to
human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons who have the power of making
laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt
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arms of government are supposed to check each other and to be independ-
ent. According to Montesque:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same per-
son, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty, if the
judicial power be not separated from the legislative and executive.
Were it combined with legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge might behave with
violence and oppression. There would be an end to everything, were
the same man, or the same body, be it of nobles or the people, to exer-
cise those three powers, that of implementing the public resolutions and
that of adjudicating the causes of individuals. 17
3
Indeed, the scheme proposed by Montesque envisioned a neater division-
namely, that no member of one organ could participate in the organs;
there could be no interference in the function of one organ by the others
and, there was a clear dichotomy of functions exercised by the different
organs. In practice, however, there is tremendous fusion between the
three entities.
As far as individual rights and freedoms are concerned, the independ-
ence of the judicial arm of government is very crucial. The rights and
freedoms that limit the exercise of legislative and executive power will be
of practical value only if they can be enforced judicially. Obviously, the
notion of an independent judiciary presupposes that the vulnerability of
judicial officers to the executive is minimized, and that the regime of
human rights and other norms are clearly articulated. The duty of the
judiciary is to interpret the law, or simply stated, to establish conclusively
what the law is in every case. The judges are expected to do so without bias
or improper pressure. Government officials and the overall state
bureaucracy are expected to obtain guidance from judicial pronounce-
ments just as much as ordinary citizens. Implicit in the function of the
judiciary is the authority to conduct judicial review. Since Justice John
Marshall's edict in Marbury v. Madison that "it is the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is," the U.S. Supreme Court has in several
themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making and
execution, to their private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the
rest of the community contrary to the end of society and government; therefore, in well
ordered commonwealth, where the good of the whole is considered as it ought, the
legislative power is put in the hands of diverse persons who, duly assembled, have by
themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws." See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, CHAPTER XII PARA. 143 quoted in OJWANG, supra note 24, at
5.
173. OJWANG, supra note 24, at 6.
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of its decisions established fundamental constitutional principles without
altering or overriding the basic provisions of the constitution. 4 The Brown
v. Board of Education,"' and Roe v. Wade 16 decisions can be cited in this
regard.
The independence of the judiciary also infers that every person, insti-
tution and the government are bound to act in accordance with the "law."
In this regard the exercise of judicial function provides a link between the
aspirations of society and the positive law. In countries where the judiciary
has lost its independence, the realization of rights and freedoms has
become difficult. In Kenya for example, despite a guarantee of rights by
the Bill of Rights contained in Chapter Five of the Constitution, violations
still occur.177
Constitutionalism is not all about restraint on government and the
protection of individual rights and freedoms. But, it is also about setting
general principles that reflect the fundamental aspirations and ideals of
society.' Nwabueze has espoused this view as follows:
A constitution operating as law and imposing judicially enforceable
restraints upon government should not abandon its other function as a
source of legitimacy for those governmental powers and relations that
are, by their very nature, non-justifiable. Nor should it renounce its role
in the affirmation of fundamental objectives and ideals or directive
principles of government which serve to inform and inspire governmen-
tal actions along desirable lines.
79
174. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
175. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). This decision overruled an earlier opinion in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Supreme Court's interpretation of the 14th
Amendment to outlaw segregation in schools is perhaps what makes this case one of the
most celebrated in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence.
176. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The court held that there was a constitutional
right to abortion. It affirmed that the right to privacy was "broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether:or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153. The U.S.
Constitution does not explicitly guarantee rights to privacy-the same is borne out of the
Court's interpretation of the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 14th Amendments to the Constitution.
177. See generally Mutua, supra note 3.
178. Professor Issa G. Shivji has observed that out of the two pillars, "limited
government" and "individual rights," flows several other notions such as "accountability
of government through periodic elections" and others. Issa G. Shivji, State and
Constitutionalism in Africa: A New Democratic Perzspective, in STATE AND CONSTITUTION-
ALISM: AN AFRICAN DEBATE 28 (I.G. Shivji ed., 1991).
179. B.O. NWABUEZE, JUDICIALISM IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE
COURTS iN GOVERNMENT 22-23 (Hurst & Co. 1977).
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It is a process of setting national goals, and erecting structures to ensure
their attainment. Constitutionalism is thus an ordering process. In the
words of Carl Friedrich, constitutionalism should address itself to "the will
to live together in a political community."' 80 Such will is concerned with
"the internal mechanism for the stable maintenance of community" as well
as the "institutional regulatory and normative structures of national
integrity and survival...... Friedrich argues that the strength of a state rests
on power allocation based on these normative structures.
In multi-ethnic societies, constitutionalism implies a more profound
task of creating harmony and forging national unity. It has even been
suggested that constitutionalism imports a very pluralistic look at the
political society, legitimizes organized dissent, and restricts the power of
the majority as against the minority. Constitutions should erect features
that will insulate societies from the innate problems of ethnicity.
83
Propagating a culture of constitutionalism, by far remains the greatest
challenge to most African states. As shown in this article, the adoption of
independence constitutions replete with articles protecting individual
rights and freedoms and delineating functions of the three organs of
government, has not prevented what some analysts have called the
"bastardization"184 of the same. In Kenya, the complete lack of respect for
the constitutional guarantees has been exacerbated by total lack of
education by the populace on what the constitution portends. Hopefully,
this will change if the proposed program of civic education by the recently
proposed Constitutional Reform Commission is implemented.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW PROCESS
After suffering a resounding defeat by KANU in the 1992 general
elections, the opposition groups became wary of facing the 1997 election
without reforming the Constitution. The folly of not having insisted on the
leveling of political playing field before multi-party elections starkly
reverberated upon the faces of the opposition chiefs, and more so as the
second multi-party elections drew near. Thus, the call for minimum
constitutional reform before election became a rallying epithet for all
180. CARL J. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 220
(Chicago Univ. Press 1963).
181. Id.; see also C. HOWARD, THE CONSTITUTION POWER AND POLITICS 13-23 (1980).
182. FRIEDRICH, supra note 180.
183. Jadusola Akande, Constitutionalism and Pluralism, Essays in Honour of Judge
Taslim Olawale Elias, 2 AFRICAN COMP. PUB. L. 659.
184. See, e.g., Mutahi Ngunyi, Making Laws is Bad, DAILY NATION, June 28, 1998, at 9
(Nairobi).
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opposition groups and the National Council of Churches in Kenya
(NCCK). The agenda was also picked up by the Catholic Church and the
international donor community.'8
The government, on its part, acknowledged that reform was indeed
necessary, but insisted that the opposition groups and churches were going
about it the wrong way."' However, no serious effort was made to bring
this promise to fruition. Now, with the NGO community and opposition
groups threatening mass action, strikes and boycott of the impending
elections, the government, like a lethargic fly caught in a spider's web,
found it self entangled in a self-induced rhetoric trap. It had to deliver on
its promise. In a quick spin of action, the government announced its
intention to negotiate with opposition parties' only (excluding NGOs and
other civil society groups), minimum reforms before elections. The
opposition parties, being wary of the NGO's prominence in the pro-reform
movement, accepted this gesture and convened, together with KANU at
Nairobi City Hall to negotiate reforms. 1 The group became known as the
Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG).9 The IPPG round of talks were
largely successful. Several issues were discussed and agreed upon such as
the immediate removal of licensing requirement for political meetings, the
diminution of the chief's powers under the Chiefs Authority Act, and the
candid promise for the repeal of the Public Order Act. Most importantly,
however, was the agreement that constitutional reform process would
begin immediately after the elections, and that it would involve all the
stakeholders.
As a gesture of goodwill, the government presented to Parliament the
Constitution of Kenya Review Act on November 6, 1997, and the same
was readily passed.1' ° The unpublished Bill mandated the Attorney
185. Sylvia Mudasia, NCCK Reignites Reform Debate, DAILY NATION, Jan. 10, 1997, at 1
(Nairobi); see also Jacinta Sekoh & Tom Chitechi, Postpone Poll, Says Gitari, DAILY
NATION, Jan. 13, 1997, at 1 (Nairobi).
186. Onesmus Kilonzo, Catholic Group Warns of Chaos, SUNDAY NATION, Apr. 20, 1997,
at 3 (printed by DAILY NATION, Nairobi).
187. See, e.g., Jacinta Sekoh, KANU Reacts to NCCK Demands, DAILY NATION, Jan. 11,
1997, at 1 (Nairobi).
188. Take Law Reform Effort Seriously, DAILY NATION, Jan. 16, 1998, at 9 (Nairobi). In
fact, it was the president himself, who in a New Year's address to the nation in 1995,
mentioned that among the tasks that the government was to undertake was the reform of
the constitution. The president further stated that the government would seek help of
international experts in collating the views of Kenyans toward the comprehensive review of
the constitution-this was not done.
189. Id.
190. Eric Shimoli, Attorney General Starts Law Review Process, DAILY NATION, Jan. 15,
1998, at 1 (Nairobi).
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General to constitute the commission that would be responsible for the
review of the constitution. '9' The commission was to have 45 members
nominated by the "registered political parties, religious groups, institu-
tional organizations, professional associations," association of disabled
persons, "trade unions, the business community, farmers, women and
youth organizations, and NGOs." '92 Upon being served by notice, these
groups had only fifteen (15) days within which to submit the list of their
nominees to the Attorney General, who thereafter was required to
compile the list of 45 people and submit it to the President. From the said
list, the President would then select 29 commissioners. The President also
has the sole discretion of appointing the commission's chairman. The Bill
gave the commission two years within which to complete its work."'
In January 1998, a month after the general elections in which KANU
won the presidential seat, the Attorney General issued a notice to all
stakeholders to nominate their representatives to the constitutional review
commission. The announcement sparked considerable opposition from
the stakeholders. The churches voiced skepticism over the government's
intention and instead advocated for the end to ethnic clashes in part of Rift
Valley before any reform could be undertaken. The opposition parties,
mainly the Democratic Party (DP), Safina and the National Convention
Executive Council called for a constitutional conference instead.9 The
NCEC made a number of uncoordinated claims. Some of its members
called for the election of commissioners, others for the repeal of the review
191. Specifically, the commission was given power to:
Examine and recommend the composition and functions of the organs of state-
mainly the Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary aiming to maximize their mutual
checks and balances and secure their independence; Examine and recommend im-
provements to the existing constitutional commissions, institutions and offices and
the establishment of additional ones to facilitate constitutional governance and the
respect for human rights as an indispensable and integral part of the enabling envi-
ronment for economic, social, political and cultural development; Examine and
make recommendations on the judiciary generally and in particular the establish-
ment and jurisdiction of the courts, aiming at measures necessary to ensure the
competence, efficiency and independence of the judiciary; Examine and review the
place of local government in the constitutional organization; Examine and review
the place of property rights and land, including private, government and trust land,
in the constitutional framework and law and to recommend improvements that will
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Act, 96 while others joined forces with opposition parties to demand for a
constitutional conference or convention. 97 The NCCK was perhaps the
most sober voice in the opposition furor that followed the Attorney
General's announcement. It recommended that the unpublished Act be
returned back to parliament to amend sections of it that were problem-.. 198
atic. It suggested that Section Five, which gave the President powers to
appoint the Chairman of the Commission, should be removed; that the
tenure of the Chairman should be secured; that non-parliamentary bodies
be allowed to nominate a fixed number of commissioners; that a consulta-
tive council comprised of 150 members mainly drawn the church and
parliament be constituted to oversee the process and finally debate the
report prepared by the Commission and draft the new constitution.
A series of meetings organized by the various groups on the constitu-
tional review seemed to indicate that there were indeed serious issues that
the government should address before the process could begin. The two-
day conference organized "by the Kenya Episcopal Conference, Kenya
Women's Political Caucus, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, the
Muslim Consultative Forum and the NGO Council," in March 1998,
proposed amendments of the Review Commission Act, and presented the
same to the Attorney General. 199 In April, the Social Democratic Party
(SDP) added its voice to the claim for amendment of the Kenya Review
Commission Act.'°° The government succumbed to these demands, but
insisted that it was the prerogative of parliament to streamline the review201
process. Consequently, the Attorney General announced the formation
of a credentials committee made up of parliamentarians from all political
parties, to prepare for a meeting of "all persons or groups who had
indicated in writing to the Mr. Wako (Attorney General) an interest to
take part in the meeting, were free to do so."' 02 This was a beginning to a
196. Jacinta Sekoh-Ochieng, Repeal Act, Says NCEC, DAILY NATION, Mar. 2, 1998, at 2
(Nairobi).
197. Id.
198. NCCK Querries Reforms Body, DAILY NATION, Feb. 27, 1998, at 3 (Nairobi).
199. Eric Shimoli, Fresh Propasalfor Law Review Act, DAILY NATION, Mar. 8, 1998, at 1
(Nairobi). The proposals for amendment included the requirement that 30% of all
commissioners be women, at least two of the commissioners be people with disabilities, the
commissioners enjoy security of tenure, the appointment of the chairman be done by the
commission and not the president, and that the commission be adequately financed.
200. SDP Wants Review Act Altered, DAILY NATION, Apr. 6, 1998, at 2 (Nairobi).
201. Kwendo Opanga, Cost of Constitution Review, DAILY NATION, Mar. 4, 1998, at 14
(Nairobi).




long, drawn out process of negotiation between the government, civil
society, and political parties. Several meetings, beginning with the Bomas
of Kenya in May 1998, to the Safari Park in June 1998, were held to discuss
the process, but all of them failing to consolidate the differing opinions
amongst interested parties.
A. The Boras and Safari Park Meetings
The Bomas of Kenya meetings were a product of inter-party political
party arrangements under the auspices of the so-called credentials
committee chaired by the then solicitor general Aaron Ringera. The first
meeting was held on May 11, 1998.203 It was attended by over 400
persons. 04 It was marked by disagreement on how the commission was to
be constituted. In the afternoon, representatives of the NCEC walked out
of the meeting accusing the IPPC and government of complacency. 05
According to Professor Kivutha Kibwana, the NCEC boss, the meeting
was a mere "charade" not intended to discuss practicality of the review206. ,0
process. He blamed the government of "treating Kenyans to a circus.
207
The meeting urged the government to increase the number of members of
the committee planning future talks, to include civil society groups. In the
whole, the meeting ended without resolving the issues at stake. In the days
that followed, four opposition members of the IPPC walked out of its
sessions claiming that their participation would be contingent upon the
enlargement of the committee to include civil society. °8 However, the
government still announced that another round of talks would be held at
Bomas on June 8-9, 1998.209 This was not to be. The opposition parties
withdrew their members from the committee and the church organizations
announced that they would not participate on the planned Bomas talks
unless their demands were met.210
On June 1, 1998, in a speech to the nation Marking the "Madaraka
day" celebration, the President acceded to the demands of opposition
203. Emman Omari & Jacinta Sekoh-Ochieng, Talks on Law Review Today, DAILY
NATION, May 11, 1998, at 1 (Nairobi).
204. Id.
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209. Id.; see also Eric Shimoli, Bomas Talks Hit by Boycott Fear, DAILY NATION, May 30,
1998, at 2 (Nairobi).
210. Catholics Keep Up Pressure on Reform, DAILY NATION, June 1, 1998, at 1 (Nairobi).
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groups to expand the committee.11 Subsequently, the Attorney General
convened another round of talks at Safari Park on June 22, 1998."' The
deliberations went on for two days after which the attendees agreed to
form a smaller committee to draft the resolutions already passed. 213 Parties
also agreed to an adjournment of the meeting to Monday, June 29, 1998.
Among the issues that got support across the party divide was the
increment of commissioners from the 29 to a number differently suggested.
214KANU suggested 65, NCEC 51, while FORD(K) suggested 51. Several
issues remained very contentious. These included the appointment of the
chairman to the commission, the role of parliament in the whole process,
the methods of collating views from the wider public and whether or not a
referendum or some form of constitutional convention would be necessary
215to ratify the new constitution.
At a further session on June 29, 1998, at Safari Park Hotel, all the
parties to the talks agreed to a three-tier structure for the review of the
216
constitution. The Constitutional Review Commission comprised of
commissioners appointed by all stakeholders, the National Consultative
Forum (NCF) to be composed of 224 members to vet the proposals put
forth by the commission, and the District Consultative Forum (DCF)
whose functions would be confined to the districts during district
meetings.21 '7 A draft committee of 12, with powers to elect its chairman,
was constituted to redraft the constitution Review Act and present it to the
final forum on August 10, 1998. The events that followed were overshad-
owed by the nationwide bankers strike that virtually paralyzed the
economic life of the country and the terrorist bomb attacks on the U.S.
Embassy in Nairobi on August 7, 1998."'
The role that KANU played after the Safari Park meetings aroused
the skeptic's fear that the ruling party was not genuinely interested in
211. Eric Shimoli & Mburu Mwangi, Moi Gives in on Constitution, DAILY NATION, June
2, 1998, at 1 (Nairobi).
212. Round Two of the Law Reform Talks on Tomorrow, DAILY NATION, June 21, 1998,
at 1 (Nairobi).
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instituting reforms. First came the presidential announcement in July thatS221
KANU rejected the three-tier arrangement agreed upon at Safari Park.
Propelled by the support from the international community following the
terrorist bomb attacks, the government adopted an increasingly hard
stance against the involvement of the civil society in the process. It was
however too late. Second, KANU agitated for a district based commission
which would take care of the interests of the "marginalized and historically
disadvantaged tribes."221 This obviated the plans for a nationally based
approach to the review process. However when the third Safari Park
meeting convened on August 24, 1998, with President Moi in attendance,
the three-tier review structure was retained. A commission of 25 was
agreed instead of 29, as well as the financial autonomy of the commis-
222
sion. A fourth meeting was set for October 5, 1998, to endorse the new
Act. At that meeting the final format for the Act was agreed and the
Attorney General was given the go ahead to translate the agreement into a
Bill to be debated and passed by parliament. In substance, it was agreed
that 13 commissioners would be nominated by the parliamentary political
parties and two would be women; the Muslim Consultative Council, Kenya
Episcopal Conference and NCCK would each nominate one person; the
women's organizations would nominate five persons, and the civil society
four. The Bill was presented to parliament on December 2, 1998, and
224passed on the same day.
B. KANU Scuttles the Review Process
After the enactment of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commis-
sion (Amendment) Act, the Kenya Women's Political Caucus became the
first to forward its list of nominees to the Attorney General in January
1999. 2  It had nominated five persons representing Central, Nyanza,
226North Eastern and Western provinces. But all was not well, as ethnicity
220. Societies Blow to Reform Talks, DAILY NATION, Aug. 1, 1998, at 1 (Nairobi).
221. Doubts Over Reform Talks, DAILY NATION, Aug. 23, 1998, at 3 (Nairobi) quoting
Kiraitu Murungi, a DP member of parliament from Imenti South constituency.
222. Emman Omari & Mburu Mwangi, Breakthrough in Talks, DAILY NATION, Aug. 25,
1998, at 1 (Nairobi).
223. Emman Omari, Review Deal Struck, DAILY NATION, Oct. 6, 1998, at 1 (Nairobi).
224. Parliament Passes Constitutional Bill, DAILY NATION, Dec. 3, 1998, at 1 (Nairobi);
see also Emman Omari et al., Constitutional Review Bill Sails Through, DAILY NATION,
Dec. 9, 1998, at 3 (Nairobi); Mburu Mwangi, Constitutional Review Act Now Law, DAILY
NATION, Dec. 26, 1998, at 2 (Nairobi).
225. Women Choose Review Team, DAILY NATION, Jan. 9, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi).
226. Id. Those nominated were Dr. Wanjiku Kibira (Central), Nancy Baraza (Western),
Phoebe Asiyo (Naynza), Abida Ali (North Eastern), and Salome Muigai (Central).
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and regionalism seemed to have taken the better of most of the women. A
group of women, including the leadership of Maendeleo ya Wanawake,
Lilian Mwaura of the National Council of Women, Jael mbogo, Orie Rogo
Manduli and others, voiced complaint that the nomination process was
flawed.2  Indeed the matter ended up in the high court after the parties
failed to reach an agreement.'28 The court affirmed the nomination. The
NGO community on the other hand, expressed dissatisfaction once again,
229
with the process of constitutional review set up by the Act 9. Spearheaded
by NCEC, they advocated for the boycott of the process terming it as
"sham" since the commission to be created would be subject to manipula-
tion. The NCEC threatened to se up a parallel process calling it "a peoples
constitutional review forum."""
The real test for the survival of the process came with the political
parties attempts to distribute the 13 seats in the commission. According to
the Act, the parties had until February 8, 1999, to nominate their
representatives. The meeting set for January 25, 1999, ended up in open
disagreement after KANU insisted on having seven nominees, instead of
the five agreed upon at the fourth Safari Park meeting. 1 The other
smaller parties, Safina and SDP, disputed the DP and NDP claim that they
should have three and two seats respectively. Other meetings on January
27, 1999,232 and February 3, 1999, failed to resolve the stalemate. 233 It
appeared, no doubt, that the review process would stagnate once more.
On the eve of the deadline, all the parties handed in their list of nominees
without consulting each other. 24 KANU handed in a list of seven, DP
three, NDP two, Kenya Women Political Caucus four, NCCK two, Civil
Society four, SDP one, FORD(K) one, Safina one, KSC one, FORD(A)
one, Shirikisho one, and FORD(P) one.35 KANU had completely ignored
227. Gitau Warigi, Women Nominees: All the Noise is Self-Serving, DAILY NATION, Jan.
24, 1999, at 5 (Nairobi).
228. Lilian Nduta, Women's Caucus Team Held Up By Court Order, DAILY NATION, Jan.
27 1999, at 2 (Nairobi).
229. Oliver Musembi, NCEC Plans People's Constitutional Forum, DAILY NATION, Jan. 9
1999, at I (Nairobi); see also NCEC Spells Out its Stand, DAILY NATION, Jan. 10, 1999, at 1
(Nairobi).
230. Musembi, supra note 229, at 1.
231. Njonjo Kihuria & Jeff Otieno, New Deadlock in Constitutional Reform Talks, DAILY
NATION, Jan. 26, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi).
232. Kipkoech Tanui, Reforms: MP's Yet to Agree on Seats, DAILY NATION, Jan. 28, 1999,
at 2 (Nairobi).
233. Kipkoech Tanui, Parties Still Divided, DAILY NATION, Feb. 4, 1999, at 6 (Nairobi).
234. Emman Omari & Chege wa Gachamba, Wako Faces Dilemma Over List of Reform




the commitments it made at Safari Park and scuttled the reform process by
nominating more that they were entitled to. Even a further attempt to
resolve the stalemate on February 18, 1999, was deliberately run down by
KANU after it sent 21 delegates instead of two.Z3 The same fate befell the
21March 25, 1999 effort. 7 Clearly, the Attorney General had the mandate
to disallow nominations from culpable quarters and steer the process from
the lull and mistrust that befell it. Unfortunately, the government's chief
legal adviser lacked the flamboyance, wit and tact to do this. As the
parties traded accusations, the office of the Attorney General went to
slumber.23 8
With the process degenerating into a period of uncertainty, and politi-
cal groups posturing all manner of threats to the government and the
ruling party KANU, all hope for restoring calm seemed to have evapo-
rated. The law society on its part asked for the extension of deadlines to
the nominations to the review commission.239 In a letter to the Attorney
General, the LSK chairman Nzamba Kitonga reminded the office of its
responsibility under the Act. It denied the claim of the church and the
NCEC, that the Act should be returned to parliament for further
deliberation because "[tihis will merely shift the same controversies to the
House and those with greater numbers will carry the day at the expense of
other legitimately interested parties.2 141 On the same streak, the LSK
objected to further postponement of the process arguing that Kenyans
should not be subjected to "injustices, and kleptocracy inherent under the
current Constitution. '"2 41 In a seminar on constitutional review organized
by CLARION, an NGO based in Nairobi, leaders of the various
organizations representing the civil society failed to agree on which way
236. Emman Omari & Njeri Rugene, KANU Derails Constitutional Review Talks, DAILY
NATION, Feb. 19, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi).
237. Njeri Rugene, Parties Snub Key IPPC Reconciliation Meeting, DAILY NATION, Mar.
26, 1999, at 2 (Nairobi). This time it was the opposition parties led by DP and SDP that
refused to attend. Id.
238. Sometime in March 1999, a group of stakeholders, mainly the nominating authorities
under the Act, sought to bring suit against the Attorney General for his inaction. Emman
Omari, Law Review: Bodies Intend to Sue AG, DAILY NATION, Mar. 28, 1999, at 5
(Nairobi). The lawyers for these groups wrote to the AG giving him notice of their
intention to sue under section 14 of the Government Proceedings Act. Id. According to
these groups, it was due to the AG's "acts of omission and commission" that the process of
constitutional review was paralyzed and the" whole nation thrown into confusion and
anxiety." Id. This cause of action was not pursued. Id.
239. Eric Shimoli, LSK Wants New Deadlines for Review Committee, DAILY NATION,




TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
the reform process should proceed.24' The NCEC stressed that the current
review Act was inherently flawed and thus should not be the basis of the
reform process. Others, including Dr. Karuti Kanyinga of the Institute of
Development Studies, University of Nairobi, argued that the problems of
Kenya were not due to bad constitution but the fact that leaders were not
responsive to the constitution.'43  The Muslim representative Mr.
Abdulrajham implored Kenyans not to "kill" the review initiatives
enunciated by the Act because it was a step forward in the reform244
process. Similar disagreements also emerged amongst lawyers. In the
LSK monthly luncheon of April 29, 1999, a group of lawyers led by Lee
Muthoga supported the review Act and asserted that the claim that it was
"unworkable" and cowardice. 45  The problem, as far as they were
concerned, was lack of goodwill on all concerned parties.
Several calls for the start of the process were made by American
Ambassador Prudence Bushnell, the Catholic Church, and the
248Protestant churches. It was the announcement by President Moi that the
review process should be sent back to parliament that spurred activity
from both sides of the debate.14 KANU leaders taking the queue from
their president, asked the Attorney General to declare the process under
the Act had failed, and thereafter refer the matter to parliament for action.
At a news conference in parliament buildings on May 26, 1999, the KANU
national organizing secretary Kalonzo Musyoka, affirmed his parties view
that the Act was "too flawed to facilitate meaningful reforms."210
The proposal that the matter be taken to parliament was opposed by
opposition parties, the civil society and churches. They saw in KANU a
sinister motive to divest from the process, the involvement of non-
242. NGOs Differ on Stalled Constitutional Review Process, DAILY NATION, Mar. 19,
1999, at 1 (Nairobi).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Lawyers Divided Over Kenya Review Commission Act, DAILY NATION, Apr. 30,
1999, at I (Nairobi).
246. Peter Njenga & John Oywa, Bushnell Urges Government to End Political
Uncertainty, DAILY NATION, Mar. 29, 1999, at 3 (Nairobi).
247. Ndingi Wants Constitutional Review Restated, DAILY NATION, Apr. 5, 1999, at 1
(Nairobi).
248. Chege wa Gachamba, Review Hitch 'Deliberate,' Churches Allege, DAILY NATION,
May 7, 1999, at 3 (Nairobi).
249. Kipkoech Tanui & Frank Wainainah, Send Law Review to Parliament-Moi, DAILY
NATION, May 23, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi).




parliamentary entities and then manipulate the reform to suit its agenda.
While a considerable section of such non-parliamentary entities may have
agreed that the Act was indeed flawed, their involvement in streamlining
the review process was conceived as necessary and mandatory since they
had sufficient stake as Kenyans, in the outcome of the whole process. In a
joint statement of NCEC, Law Society of Kenya, Presbyterian Church,
Human Rights Commission, NDP, DP, FORD(K), Safina, and SDP, the
leaders said:
We totally reject parliament as the only forum for constitution making.
We do not recognize it as representative of all voices in Kenya. We do
this appreciating that there is a stated national consensus that the con-
stitution properly belongs to all people of Kenya. We unequivocally re-
state that the constitutional review process is irreversible and must be
people driven.2
1
KANU stuck to its guns. In a number of statements at public gatherings,
the President asked parliament to take up its role and save the process
from collapse."'
The NCEC, with the support from DP called for a nationwide demon-
stration on June 10, 1999, to oppose the government's position on law
reform. The call was also supported by mainstream churches. On that
day, the police violently dispersed the demonstrators, severely injuring a
church leader, members of parliament, a senior member of NCEC, and
scores of others. 4 As the violence was going on in the streets of Nairobi,
the proceedings in parliament were equally belligerent. Incidentally, the
budget speech was set to be read on the same day. One member of
parliament raised a point of order asking for adjournment of the day's
business because the constitutional review process was not yet properly
underway. In his view it was a tragedy to discuss the budget in the
circumstances because it precipitated "bad governance."'2s5 In apparent
reference to what was going on in the streets, he said, "we are going to see
251. Leaders Dismiss Moi's Prescription for Constitutional Review, DAILY NATION, May
24, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi).
252. Muthui Mwai, Parliament Right Forum for Reforms, Insists Moi, DAILY NATION,
May 28, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi); see also Tussle over Parliament's Role in Review Exercise
Heightens, DAILY NATION, June 2, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi).
253. See Support Grows for Tomorrows Reforms Demo, DAILY NATION, June 9, 1999, at
1 (Nairobi).
254. Dozens Hurt as Police Violently Disperse Pro-Reform Marchers, DAILY NATION,
June 11, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi).
255. Emman Omari & Njeri Rugene, Orengo Tackles Moi on Constitutional Reforms,
DAILY NATION, June 11, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi).
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many scenes like we have seen today where women have been beaten in
the streets by the same policemen, who are supposed to protect them."'2 6
Despite the brutal reprisal from the police, the pro-reform groups
arranged for another demonstration on July 10, 1999.5' With threat of
another demonstration and a national poll showing that the majority of
Kenyans supported a people driven reform process,- Moi retracted his
earlier stand, claiming that he had been "misinterpreted." The NCEC
toughened its stand on planned demonstrations amidst reports that there
were secret talks between KANU and opposition MP's funded by some
foreign donors.260 At the same time the NCCK announced that it would
hold prayers for the reform process and urged its members to start a three-
month fasting period to force the government to heed to their call.26' In
July, the Catholic Church confirmed that secret talks were indeed in
262progress between the political parties with a view to end the impasse.
Seeing no end to the problem and skeptical that KANU may indeed use
such negotiation as a delaying tactic, a strong undercurrent emerged within
the ranks of protestant churches calling for a parallel review process.
C. The 'Faiths' Led Initiative (The Ufungamano Group)
It was the DP leader, Mwai Kibaki, who in February 1999, made the
first call for a parallel review process, different from the government's
initiative under the Review Act.263 In August 1999, the Anglican Church
joined in the call and asked interested parties to organize for a fifth Safari
Park to begin the process . 64 According to a signed statement, the Church
observed that such a step is necessary because the government and
256. Id.
257. Samuel Siringi, Constitution: Protest Demo Planned for July 10, DAILY NATION, June
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political parties have failed to resolve the stalemate. It called on churches
to spearhead change by instituting a parallel constitutional process. The
Catholic Church affirmed its position that they would favor a people-
driven process and launched a series of educational materials for the
reform process. Further, a group of twenty-three Bishops announced
that they would organize countrywide prayers in support of a people-
driven process in October 1999.26 The acrimony between the Catholic
Church and the government was not made any better when the govern-
ment issued an order expelling one of their priests from Kenya, 67 and
about 700 Catholic parishes asked Moi to resign because he was "too old
and tired to change." 2'6 Apart from the church, the Law Society of Kenya
(LSK) indicated their intention of instituting a reform process, removed
from the government initiative. It announced that as a beginning to such a
process, a seminar of all stakeholders would soon be called to discuss
amongst other things, a framework for reviving a "people-driven"
269
constitutional review process.
The indications were rife that unless the government did something,
the mantle was going to be stolen from their hands, and its credibility
injured beyond repair. Considerable debate went on within the KANU
top notch, seeking ways to redeem their image and capture leadership of
the reform process. Indeed, a lackluster attempt to salvage the process
through Parliament failed after procedural bottlenecks debarred the
attempt to introduce the debate under standing order number 20.270 In the
meantime, religious groups comprising of NCCK, SUPKEM, Hindu
council, MCC and others, met in Ufungamano to strategize on their move
265. Emman Omari & Vincent Mwangi, Catholics Start Review Process, DAILY NATION,
Sept. 27, 1999, at 3 (Nairobi).
266. Bishops to Lead Prayers, DAILY NATION, Oct. 17, 1999, at 2 (Nairobi).
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DAILY NATION, Oct. 30, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi). But the story of Father John Kaiser, an
American-born Catholic missionary who had worked in Kenya for over 35 years, did not
end here. Gitau Warigi, Why Government Picked on Catholic Priest, DAILY NATION, Nov.
7, 1999, at 12 (Nairobi). Though the government later rescinded their order after immense
pressure by the opposition groups, the NGO community and the U.S. government, his
personal relationship with some senior KANU operatives did not fare any better. Id.
268. 700 Catholic Parishes Asking Moi to Step Down, DAILY NATION, Nov. 1, 1999, at 1
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to resist the KANU intention of returning the reform process to Parlia-
ment .
On December 3, 1999, the religious groups announced that they had
resolved to start a constitutional review process of their own.17 ' As a
prelude to this process, they invited all stakeholders to a meeting on
December 15, 1999, to agree on the modalities of implementing this
initiative. In the meantime, about 52 opposition members of Parliament
issued a threat to hold a parallel Jamhuri day celebration at Kamkunji
grounds to press the government to accept their demands for a people-
driven constitutional reform.17 Moi quickly called for an all-political party
meeting to discuss the way forward. Obviously, his intention was to
dissuade them from their planned meeting by promising to begin the
274process of reform. The meeting was not successful. On December 15,
just as the motion for constitutional review was being discussed in
Parliament, the religious groups and NGO groups formed a committee at
Ufungamano to spearhead the talks on reform.275
The Commission elected Dr. Oki Ooko Ombaka as its chairman and
Abida Ali as vice chairperson. 21' Two major problems dogged the
Ufungamano team. The first was indeed the question of legitimacy. For
the process to be legitimate it was incumbent upon the commissioners to
collate views of all Kenyan's, wherever they were. This meant that the
Ufungamano group, would have to visit KANU strongholds such as Rift
Valley and Coast province. Of course, KANU politicians instructed their
277
constituents to expel Ufungamano commissioners from their regions. In
November 2000, NDP youths were reported to have ambushed Ufunga-
mano commissioners in Kisumu. In the chaos and melee that ensued, a
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1999, at 3 (Nairobi).
276. Ombaka to Chair Ufungamano Team, DAILY NATION, May 15, 2000, at 3 (Nairobi).




Land Rover belonging to the NCCK was burnt to ashes and a number of
people were hurt.278 NDP denied complicity.
Other problems of the group had to do with paucity of resources.
Understandably, the groups that backed the initiative controlled vast
resources and the fear within KANU was that they could put these into use
to marshal support for their initiative. However, there was no set
mechanism of how the group would be financed. Further, internal
squabbling and jostling for leadership positions prevented the Ufunga-
mano group from making an impact. Soon after the establishment of the
commission, the NCEC announced that the initiative was indecisive,
lacked openness, and a referee to guide its activity."' Though dismissed by
the commission's chairman, the views expressed by the NCEC spelt much
more widely the edifice of the reform initiative. The reform initiative was
saved from internal collapse by the unification with the parliamentary
commission. Ufungamano initiative announced in June 2001, that it would
officially wind up its activities when the merger with the parliamentary
280group, was finally sanctioned by law.
D. Enter Raila Odinga of NDP
Raila Odinga, the son of the late octogenarian politician Jaramogi
Oginga Odinga resigned from the party founded by his father, FORD (K),
on New Year's Eve of 1996.281 He immediately joined the National
development party of Kenya (NDP) and took over its leadership from the
2822little known, Stephen Omondi Oludhe. From then on, Raila became the
backbone of opposition politics in Kenya with his Luo supporters coming
out in large numbers to support his calls for demonstrations in Nairobi and
other key centers. However, toward the end of 1999, Raila and the NDP
supporters started to soften their approach to opposition politics. It is not
a surprise that as opposition parties and the churches jostled for control of
the reform process, KANU and NDP entered into secret merger talks.
The leader of NDP, Raila Odinga surprised the opposition MP's when he
announced that he would soon table in parliament a motion to jump start
the review process.2 3 However, the motion was contentious because it
278. Chaos at Reform Meeting, DAILY NATION, Nov. 27, 2000, at 1 (Nairobi).
279. Owino Opondo, Ufungamano Split Over Review Format, DAILY NATION, 2000, at 3
(Nairobi).
280. Religious Law Reform to Wind Up, DAILY NATION, June 9, 2001, at 1 (Nairobi).
281. Ochieng Sino, Raila Defects, Resigns as MP, DAILY NATION, Jan. 1997, at 1
(Nairobi).
282. Id.
283. Round of Criticism Against NDP Leader, DAILY NATION, Oct. 24, 1999, at 1
(Nairobi).
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sought to confer power on the Attorney General to reconvene a meeting
of stakeholders to debate the Act and recommend amendments.2M Amidst
intense lobbying by KANU MP's, a below the curtains meeting in
Mombasa was organized and a resolution struck for the formation of a
285parliamentary select committee to handle the reform process.
Though thoroughly opposed by the NGOs, DP and SDP members of
Parliament, the idea gained momentum because it seemed more pragmatic
than the suggestions for another conference of stakeholders. While the
term "people-driven" appeared rather amorphous and inchoate at the very
least, the camouflaged intention of the so-called stakeholders appeared to
have been aimed at lessening or totally eradicating KANU's influence in
the process. However, the manner in which the opposition groups and the
general NGO community went about advocating their displeasure against
the ruling party, and posturing themselves to take control of the review
process, was characterized by impudent parochialism. The call by the
NCEC for a military take over2 and the establishment of a parallel
government for example, 287 exhibited just how the edifice of NGO
arrogance and the shortsightedness inherent to their scheme could steer
the reform process into abject turmoil. Further, by converting other
sections of society to support their agenda, the NGO program of action
precipitated utter mayhem in Nairobi and other major towns in Kenya.
The devastating four-day riots by the University of Nairobi students in
January 2000, began by instigation of opposition figures and some NGO
personalities. The riots depicted a growing division among student ranks
on the two parallel frontiers of the constitutional review debate.M But
KANU and their supporters were not idle spectators in many of these
instances. They, unlike their NGO counter parts, enjoyed police
protection and thus their complacence and/or inaction in certain cases,
allowed for even greater havoc.
284. Id.
285. Njeri Rugene, 50 MPs Plot New Law Reform Deal, DAILY NATION, Nov. 28, 1999, at
1 (Nairobi).
286. Chege wa Gachamba, Military Proposed for Kenya's Reform Government, DAILY
NATION, Nov. 5, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi); see also Treason Accusations as NCEC is Condemned,
DAILY NATION, Nov. 6, 1999 (Nairobi); Jacinta Sekoh-Ochieng, NCEC: We Didn't Call for
a Military Government, DAILY NATION, Nov. 7, 1999 (Nairobi); Mugambi Kiai & Willy
Mutunga, Constitution-Making and the Military: What is So Insane About NCEC's Idea?,
DAILY NATION, Nov. 14,1999 (Nairobi).
287. Oliver Musembi, Group Demands Parallel Government, DAILY NATION, Apr. 16,
2000, at 3 (Nairobi).
288. Samuel Siringi & Wahome Thuku, Mayhem as Reform Rivals Clash, DAILY NATION,
Jan. 16, 2000, at 3 (Nairobi).
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The only persons other than KANU operatives who came out in
support of the Raila motion were university professors, HWO Okoth
Ogendo, and Jackton B. Ojwang."' The former is an internationally
recognized and respected professor of property law. The latter, though not
conspicuous in local political debates, is probably the most well-qualified
constitutional law academic in Kenya today.29° The professors castigated
the NGO approach to the process of reform, and advocated for the
establishment of a commission to review the constitution. They also
expressed strong dissatisfaction with politicians, especially KANU MP's,
for being selfish and merely attendant to their own interests.
The motion paving way for parliamentary involvement in the reform
process was tabled by the NDP leader Raila Odinga on December 15,
1999, and eventually passed."' It constituted a parliamentary select
committee of 21 members and called on the Attorney General to restart
the review process by convening a meeting of stakeholders within seven
days.2 2  Parliament nominated Raila Odinga as the chairman of the
293
committee. In effect, the Parliament had given its authority for the re-
examination of the Constitution of the Kenya Review Act passed by
Parliament. Most importantly, the parliamentary committee had legal
standing and could summon any person to give information before it.2
94
With the parliamentary committee in place, the reform process was
set to begin in earnest. Its chairman, Raila Odinga, announced that the
collection of views from the public would be preceded by a meeting
289. Nzamba Kitonga, Querries Over Dons Law Reform Agenda, DAILY NATION, Dec.
19, 1999, at 10 (Nairobi).
290. He is currently the Dean of the Law Faculty at the University of Nairobi.
291. Njeri Rugene, MPs to Oversee Review as NDP Move Triumphs, DAILY NATION,
Dec. 16, 1999, at 1 (Nairobi).
292. Id.
293. Emman Omari, Fury as Raila Heads House Team, DAILY NATION, Dec. 17, 1999, at
3 (Nairobi). Other members of the committee were, from KANU: Musalia Mudavadi
(KANU), Julius Sunkuli, Joseph Kamotho, Kalonzo Musyoka, Mohamed Affey, Jembe
Mwakalu, Joseph Kiangoi, Fred Gumo, Seif Kajembe, Shaban Isaac, Paul Sang, Justin
Muturi, Zephaniah Nyangwara, Ziporah Kittony. Id. From FORD(K) was John Munyasia;
from NDP, Otieno Kajwang, Safina's Adan Keynan; KSC, George Anyona, and
Shirikisho's Rashid Shakombo. Id. The DP and SDP members reclined their positions. Id.
294. Parliamentary committees are given such powers by section 23 of the National
Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, Chapter of the Laws of Kenya. Disobedience to
summons issued by the committee is punishable by imprisonment, or a fine of 2000 Kenyan
shillings (Kshs.), or both.
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between the committee and experts from all parts of the world.2 5 Many
individuals and groups appeared before it and gave their views on reform.
Most mainstream NGOs declined the invitation. For example, the
Federation of International Women Lawyers (FIDA) refused the
invitation saying that the committee was set up "illegally and unilater-.. . 297
ally."' 96 Lawyers, prominent retired politicians, academicians from all
walks of life-local and foreign leaders of indigenous churches,"" ordinary
citizens and members of parliament appeared before the commission. This
occurred despite the spirited efforts by some sections of the opposition to
299derail its function. The committee wound up its public hearings on
March 14, 2000.
The report prepared by the Raila committee revised some of the
provisions of the Constitution Review Act. It removed the three-tier
process and instead affirmed the Attorney General's key role in the300
process. It also gave Parliament the power to appoint the constitutional
review commission that would collate views from the public and draft the
constitution. The chairman of the commission was to be appointed by the
President from a list presented to him by Parliament. Like its predecessor,
295. Njeri Rugene, Now Raila Calls an Array of Foreign Lawyers, DAILY NATION, Dec.
22, 1999, at 3, 8-9 (Nairobi); see also Gitau Warigi, Do We Need Foreign Experts, DAILY
NATION, Jan. 16,2000 (Nairobi).
296. FIDA Rejects Review Invitation, DAILY NATION, Jan. 19, 2000, at 3 (Nairobi).
FIDA's view was rather surprising given that the lawyer's organization, more than anybody
else, should have acknowledged the legitimacy of parliament as the law-making organ of
government.
297. Elders Present Reform Views, DAILY NATION, Feb. 2, 2000, at 10 (Nairobi).
298. Pro-Committee Clerics Give Views, DAILY NATION, Feb. 3, 2000, at 44 (Nairobi).
299. The activities of DP members were particularly noteworthy in this regard. First,
came the boycott of all DP members from the committee. One DP member of parliament,
Chege Mbituri, attended 24 sessions of the committee before resigning. Emman Omari,
Mbitiru Leaves Reform Panel, DAILY NATION, Feb. 13, 2000 (Nairobi). Second, came the
allegation that NDP members of parliament had been bribed to forge unity between them
and KANU. The allegation led to a physical fight between one NDP Member of
Parliament and his colleague from DP. Eric Shimoli, MP's Fight Over Reforms, DAILY
NATION, Jan. 21, 2000 (Nairobi); see also Emman omari, Speaker Steps in Over Feuding
MPs, DAILY NATION, Jan. 26, 2000 (Nairobi); Top Editors Summoned Over Bribery Story,
DAILY NATION, Jan. 25,2000 (Nairobi). Finally, in an effort to debilitate NDP, it facilitated
the resignation of the latter key officers, namely, the secretary general, the national
organizing secretary and the deputy national treasury. The trio announced their resignation
at a press conference in March 2000. Owino Opondo, Senior NDP Officials Resign, DAILY
NATION, Mar. 19, 2000 (Nairobi).




the new commission would have two years to accomplish its task. 0 Many,
including the Ufungamano group, the LSK, the mainstream media and
opposition parties, castigated the report. A political commentator for the
Sunday Nation newspaper made a prediction bordering on apocalypse:
He wrote:
There is no need to beat about the bush. And this is not the time to
engage in idle arguments. Avery very crucial point must be made
openly, clearly, candidly. The point is this. The parliamentary Select
committee on constitutional reform has made a grave mistake ... The
overall picture tells the whole sad story. It is that the committee has
decided to hand the entire constitutional reform plate to President Moi
to do with it whatever he pleases... Our future, our children's future,
this country's future are all in peril if Kenya heads the way this select
committee wants.
303
And yet this was not to be so. The report ushered in a fresh bid to
jumpstart the stalled process. It created a solid and legally justifiable
framework within which the diverse opinions on the future of the nation
could be articulated without endangering the rule of law. No matter the
machinations of KANU, and quite contrary to the predictions above, by
bringing in Raila and proceeding on the manner in which it did, the future
of the reform process was set to slip from the hands of Moi and his party.
It's Raila who probably read the signs of time correctly when he informed
his critics to "read the report properly and discuss its merits or demerits
rather than speak out of hearsay or misreading of media reports on it.
' 134
The widespread suspicion for the Raila committee report by the NGO's
and section of the opposition was not shared by a majority of Kenyans.
Indeed, many criticized the call by DP chairman Mwai Kibaki and the
NCEC for "mass action""3 ' and the establishment of a parallel govern-
ment.3°6 The Daily Nation newspaper editorial of April 3, 2000, headed
"Mass Action won't help our country," was a clear summation of the
broader view that empathized with a legal approach to the whole issue of
constitutional review. Similarly, the NCCK rejected both the mass action
301. Id.
302. Gitau Warrigi, Raila's Group Made a Horrible Mistake, DAILY NATION, Apr. 9,
2000, at 6 (Nairobi).
303. Id.
304. Njeri Rugene & David Mugonyi, Critics Misled, Raila Declares, DAILY NATION, Apr.
9, 2000, at 1-2 (Nairobi).
305. Kipkoech Tanui, Kibaki Now in the Firing Line, DAILY NATION, Apr. 13, 2000, at 1
(Nairobi).
306. Musembi, supra note 287.
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approach and the establishment of parallel government: Waking from
his slumber, the Attorney General issued a warning to the NCEC and their
sympathizers that they risked arrest for undermining the constitution and
its bodies.3°0
The report of the Raila committee was passed by Parliament on April
26, 200039 Out of this report, the Attorney General drafted the Constitu-
tion of Kenya Review (Amendment) Bill of 2000. The Bill came before
the House on June 6, 2000, it resumed immediately after a three-week
recess. The same was readily passed with minor amendments.310 The Act
now gave Parliament authority to set up the Constitution Review
Commission comprised of 23 members. In October 2000, the government
advertised the positions and gave aspirants until November 2, 2000, to send
in their applications."' At the same time, the House also set up a
committee to interview and short list the applicants for final approval by
312the President. The committee came up with 23 nominees. The list
included, HWO Okoth-Ogendo, a respected legal scholar, Yash Ghai, a
leading constitutional law expert and professor of law at Hong Kong
University, a number of practicing lawyers, career politicians, retired civil
313
servants and clerics. The list also included the names of two persons
slated for the position of the secretary. The president was obliged to
choose 15 commissioners and a secretary from the list.
E. The Ghai Commission
On November 10, 2000, the final list of commissioners was released.
The President had appointed Professor Yash Ghai, chairman to the
commission and Arthur Okoth-Owiro its secretary.31 4 Other commission-
ers were: Keriako Tobiko (practicing lawyer), Pastor Zablon Ayonga,
307. Ngumbao Kithi, NCCK Rejects Mass Action, DAILY NATION, Apr. 22, 2000, at 1, 5
(Nairobi). On April 22, the Ufungamano group also disassociated itself from the calls for
mass action and establishment of parallel government. See Ufungamano Rejects Mass
Action, DAILY NATION, Apr. 23, 2000, at 3 (Nairobi).
308. Owino Opondo, Attorney Generals Warning to NCEC, DAILY NATION, Apr. 18,
2000, at 2 (Nairobi).
309. Njeri Rugene, Parliament Passes Raila Report, DAILY NATION, Apr. 27,2000, at 1, 16
(Nairobi).
310. Review Commission Bill Passes First Reading, DAILY NATION, June 7, 2000, at 7
(Nairobi).
311. Emman Omari, House Review Begins, DAILY NATION, Oct. 7, 2000, at 24 (Nairobi).
312. Id.
313. Gitau Warigi, Review Team List Finally Released, DAILY NATION, Nov. 5, 2000, at 8-
9 (Nairobi).




Mutakha Kangu (practicing lawyer), Githu Muigai (lawyer), Bishop
Bernard Njoroge, Paul Musili (lawyer), Domisiano Ratanya (retired civil
servant), Ahmed Idha Salim (former Kenya's Ambassador in Stockholm),
Mohammed Abdaulla Swazuri (former lecturer), and HWO Okoth-
Ogendo (professor of law).:' The establishment of a commission and the
appointment of Prof. Yash Pal Ghai as its head heralded the beginning of a
serious approach toward constitutional reform. Undisputedly, Prof. Ghai's
appointment revamped the credibility of the whole process and allayed
fears that the KANU-NDP alliance may simply install their surrogates at
the helm of such an important review body. The divisions and tensions
that the process had gathered in its five-year history, and the very
existence of a parallel team-the Ufungamano group, signaled to the
commission a very bumpy approach toward the achievement of its goal.
But this was just one of the challenges that the Ghai commission has had
to deal with in its short history. Corruption, insubordination, and lack of
political goodwill signaled an even greater challenge for the review team.
1. Toward a Unified Review Process
Indeed Ghai's immediate concern after his appointment was to marry
the two reform initiatives before any progress could be made on the actual
review process. According to him, it was in the interest of all, that the
review process be conducted in peace, even if the negotiations were to take
316time. To show his commitment to this cause, he declined to be sworn
until the two groups came together.317 The gesture for reconciliation by
318Professor Ghai to the Ufungamano team was at first flatly rejected .
However, after intense lobbying and mutual consultations amongst
members of the two groups, the Ufungamano team agreed to set up a
small committee to negotiate with Professor Ghai.319 The committee met
315. Id.
316. Emman Omari, Fresh Unity Bid in Reform Talks, DAILY NATION, Nov. 29, 2000, at
1-2 (Nairobi).
317. Chege wa Gachamba, Reform Top Organ Meet, DAILY NATION, Dec. 1, 2000, at 3
(Nairobi); see also Stephen Mburu, Parallel Reforms Useless, Says Ghai, DAILY NATION,
Dec. 3, 2000, at 4 (Nairobi). Professor Ghai and his team were sworn on January 26, 2001,
after the merger process was already in top gear. Chege wa Gachamba, Prof. Ghai Sworn in
as Reform Chairman, DAILY NATION, Jan. 27, 2001, at 1 (Nairobi).
318. Chege wa Gachamba & Hannah Gakuo, Reform Merger Snub, DAILY NATION, Nov.
30, 2000, at 1 (Nairobi).
319. Unity Hopes Grow, DAILY NATION, Dec. 15, 2000, at 1 (Nairobi); see also Jacinta
Senkoh-Ochieng & Benson Abele, SUPKEM Supports Ghai Bid, DAILY NATION, Jan. 10,
2001, at 3 (Nairobi).
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on December 19, 2000, to draft proposals for merger.3"' Amongst the
proposals was the claim for equal number of representatives on the
commission. The Ufungamano then wrote a letter to Raila Odinga
requesting an early meeting, saying that time was of the essence. 32' After a
series of meetings, both sides announced that they had reached some form
of settlement that would incorporate the Ufungamano faction into the
reform process. This however, would necessitate the amendment of the
Review Act. Both teams appointed persons to draft amendments, which
322
were presented to the Attorney General on February 21, 2001.
After the publication of the two amendment Bills, the Constitution of
Kenya (Amendment) Bill and the Constitution of Kenya Review
(Amendment) Bill, the Ufunganano team nominated its commissioners to
the commission. These were: Dr. Ooko Ombaka, Abida Ali Aroni, Dr.
Wanjiku Kabira, Nancy Baraza, Amina S. Kassim, Salome Muigai, Dr.
Charles Maranga, Riunga Raiji, Ibrahim Lithome Asmani, Isaac Lenaola,
Abubakar Zein, Al Haj Baricha. 323 These commissioners joined their
counterparts earlier appointed by the Raila team. In total, the commis-
sioners were twenty-seven, with 12 from Ufungamano and the rest were
parliamentary nominees. In April 2001, the commission announced the
formation of various committees, namely, the information communication
and publicity to be headed by Kavetsa Adagala, Finance administration by
Alice Yano, Civic education by Paul Wambua Musili, research and
drafting by HWO Okoth Ogendo.324
2. Insubordination
Having surmounted the problem of a divided reform initiative, the
Ghai commission was now left to deal with its internal problems.
Obviously, the fact that the commissioners had come from somewhat
different ideological backgrounds, there was bound to be some difference
in opinion on many levels. Indeed as it has turned out, there continues to
320. Chege wa Gachamba, Review Team Meets to Draft Terms, DAILY NATION, Dec. 20,
2000, at 3 (Nairobi).
321. Chege wa Gachamba, Faiths Led Team Calls for Talks, DA[LY NATION, Jan. 11,
2001, at 3 (Nairobi).
322. Ernman Omari, What Ghai's New Bill Says, DAILY NATION, Feb. 22, 2001, at 5
(Nairobi); see also Chege wa Gachamba, Parties Agree on Review Framework, DAILY
NATION, Mar. 14, 2001, at 1 (Nairobi); Yes to Merger, DAILY NATION, Mar. 22, 2001, at 1
(Nairobi).
323. Chege wa Gachamba, Ugungamano Picks Commissioners, DAILY NATION, Apr. 7,
2001, at 1 (Nairobi).
324. Emman Omari & Muriithi Muruiki, House Team Backs Ghai, DAILY NATION, Apr.
20, 2001, at 1 (Nairobi).
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be internal divisions and wrangling among the members of the commission
that has greatly undermined its credibility. First came the revelation that
some of its members had visited state house without knowledge and
authority of its chairman. 3 It was alleged that ten commissioners, seen by
many as allied to KANU, visited state house for some unnamed purpose.
The hue and cry from the commissioners left behind resulted in a very
heated exchange in the commissions meeting called to resolve the matter.
According to the chairman, this was an attempt to sabotage the process. "I
find it hard to understand why some national leaders try to subvert this
process. I can only conclude that there is a narrow and personal agenda
and that the national agenda is not uppermost in their minds. 3 26 The ten
commissioners who visited state house explained that their purpose of
doing so was to seek assurance from the President that the commission
would not be dissolved prematurely.327 But this was not to be the end of
such a secret visit to state house by any of the commissioners. On April 15,
the local dailies reported that Alice Yano, in company of some 11 Kalenjin
lawyers visited the President at his home in Kabarak.3 8 The purpose of
the meeting was not disclosed.
Then came the accusations against the commission's secretary Okoth-
Owiro, by the chairman, for financial impropriety, poor performance, and
conduct.2 9 As Professor Ghai pushed for removal of Owiro, the secretary
made counter-allegations of a similar nature against his chairman. Nobody,
except the secretary and the chairman, will ever know the truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegations and counter allegations raised by both sides, as
the planned disciplinary hearing never took place and the High Court suit
filed by the beleaguered secretary was settled before it came to full
hearing. 3° Owiro went on leave paving way for the commission to
advertise his job. In a one-page statement the next day Owiro tended his
325. Macharia Gaitho, Visit to Moi Splits Ghai Reform Team, DAILY NATION, Apr. 13,
2001, at 2 (Nairobi).
326. Ghai: I Feel Let Down, DAILY NATION, Apr. 14,2001, at 1 (Nairobi).
327. Emman Omari, Why Law Reform Team Visited Moi, DAILY NATION, April 16, 2001,
at 5 (Nairobi). Two of the commissioners, Keriako Tobiko and Musili Wambua, denied that
they had any regrets nor apologies for their visit. They also denied that they required
consent from anybody to visit state house. Furor Over Statehouse Visit, SUNDAY NATION,
April 15, 2001, at 3 (printed by DAILY NATION, Nairobi).
328. Emman Omari, KANU Out to Cut Ghai Powers, DAILY NATION, Apr. 19, 2001, at 3
(Nairobi).
329. Review Team Secretary Gets Reprieve, DAILY NATION, Aug. 9, 2001, at 3 (Nairobi).
330. David Mugonyi & Pamela Chepkemei, Owiro Finally Off the Hook, DAILY NATION,
Aug. 24, 2001, at 3 (Nairobi).
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resignation saying that the differences between him and the chairman were
irreconcilable. He stated:
Given the rancor and acrimony that characterized the relationship
between myself and Prof Ghai, it is obvious to me that the two of us
cannot work together. For this reason, and in the interest of the nation
and the review process, I have decided to step aside as commission
331
secretary....
Patrick Lumumba, a founding member of Movement for Dialogue
and Non-Violence (MODAN),332 and a law lecturer at the University of
Nairobi's Faculty of Law, was hired as the new secretary to the commis-
sion.333 Lumumba, a regular to local political discourse, who in a letter to
the Nation newspaper in March 1998334 called on the NCEC to give the
Parliament a chance to create the framework for review, a prediction that
by all merits had come true, was seen by many as a befitting replacement
to the embattled Okoth Owiro. The commission's image has undeniably
improved and the secretariat is dutifully performing it functions.
3. Paucity of Resources
According to the 2001/2002 Supplementary Estimates, the Commis-
sion should have at its disposal Kenyan shillings (Kshs.) 300 million. This
amount was to be placed at the Commission's disposal once Parliament
passed the two Bills.333 The two were passed in parliament on May 8, 2001,
and assented by President on May 17, 2001. With the expanded mandate
that included civic education, the Commission will no doubt need more
money. The Commission Chairman has appealed to donors to fund the 2.6
billion deficit in the constitutional review process.336
331. Owiro Quits Law Team Over Clashes With Ghai, DAILY NATION, Aug. 25, 2001, at 1
(Nairobi).
332. MODAN had come to the limelight when in April 2000, they wrote a letter to the
president, all political parties and prominent NGOs to agitate for change through peaceful
means. Groups Plea on Review Talks, DAILY NATION, Apr. 30,2000, at 3 (Nairobi).
333. David Ngunyi, City Lawyer Named Reform Team Secretary, DAILY NATION, Oct. 5,
2001, at 1 (Nairobi).
334. P.L.O. Lumumba, Logical Steps to Law Reforms, DAILY NATION, Mar. 11, 1998, at
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335. Emman Omari, Make or Break for Ghai Group, DAILY NATION, Apr. 17, 2001, at 5
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Charges of corruption within the Ghai commission have been most
disheartening."' In June 2001, Professor Ghai admitted that there was an
attempt to procure 25 expensive vehicles without his knowledge.3 38 There
were also reports that mobile telephones had similarly been ordered, and
that some commissioners were claiming up to three times the attendance
allowance for one time. 339 Later the same month, a commissioner admitted
that he had billed the commission Kshs. 500,000 for legal services he
allegedly rendered.) But he said the fee note was a "dummy" merely
meant to assist the commission to bring down fees that were being sought
by another law firm. The LSK demanded that those implicated in the
scandals should resign immediately. According to the LSK chairman, the
commission had been "morally and politically compromised beyond
repair."-" The matters were resolved within the commission and nothing
was made public.
5. Prospects
The hope that the Commission will live to accomplish its work is
strengthened as days go by. But the fear that President Moi and his
KANU friends may indeed scuttle the process still lies firmly in the sub-
conscious of opposition leaders.342 Indeed, there has been suggestion that
the commission should be entrenched in the constitution. 3 The commis-
sioners do not share the pessimism. While presenting what they called
"strategic plan for the review" in July 2002, the commissioners expressed
optimism that they would be able to accomplish their work by October
2002.344 True to their promise, the public hearings began on July 17, 2001,
337. Probe Graft Claims in Law Review Team, DAILY NATION, June 8, 2001, at 1
(Nairobi).
338. Chege wa Gachamba, Ghai Speaks Out On Sh 121 Million Deal, DAILY NATION,
June 2001, at 1 (Nairobi). The issue of mobile telephones later surfaced when the
commission was threatened with legal action for the recovery of monies owed to the
suppliers. See, Ghai Team Faces New Court Threat, SUNDAY NATION, June 10, 2001, at 3
(printed by DAILY NATION, Nairobi).
339. Id.
340. Ken Opala & Macharia Gaitho, Why Reform Lawyer Asked for Sh 500,000, DAILY
NATION, June 9, 2001, at 1 (Nairobi).
341. Pressure Mounts on Ghai Team, DAILY NATION, June 11, 2001, at 1 (Nairobi).
342. See, e.g., Paul Muite, Opposition Plight in Impending Elections, SUNDAY NATION,
Jan. 6, 2002, at 13 (printed by DAILY NATION, Nairobi).
343. Njeri Rugene, Why Hardliners Want to Derail Review Plans, DAILY NATION, Apr.
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and are continuing. 5 So far the future looks bright and it will be up to the
commission chairman to steer his boat out of unnecessary controversy and
to keep his house clean.
The task before the Commission is not an easy one. Over the years
and particularly after 1995, the constitutional reform agenda has attracted
a myriad of views from a cross-section of society. Adding to the sugges-
tions, reports, memoranda, etc. that it will collate during the hearing
process, reducing these into an acceptable constitution, may indeed pose a
challenge. As I see it, the commission may have to involve of experts at
various levels of the process. Secondly, the commission must begin
thinking of ways to extend the temporal aspects of its terms of reference.
Indeed, questions have been raised as to whether the commission will have
sufficient time to canvass people's views on these issues and come up with
a document that reflects a consensus of majority of Kenyans. 34' It is
inconceivable that the commission may be able to finish its task before
September 2002. 1 thus agree with the views of Julius Ihonvbere , that
making a constitution that enjoys legitimacy and has value not only
requires the establishment of an "independent and well financed"
constitutional commission, but also that the Commission so established has
ample time to do its work: It may thus be prudent to accomplish
'minimum reforms' to enable the country go through the transitional
election slated for December 2002. Thereafter, comprehensive review may
then be finalized.
The issues that the reform process may have to deal with are wide-
ranging. However, so that the constitutional framework provides for
mechanisms and processes that may eventually minimize the problems of
ethnicity, the following areas may at a minimum, be subject to clear
constitutional guarantee. The new constitution should:
(1) Provide for structural techniques that would change institutional
format in which ethnic conflicts occur. The proposal here is that
Kenyans should consider reducing state centric powers by estab-
lishing semi-federal arrangements that would accord autonomy to
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the various provinces in line with the current administrative zones.
The Majimbo debate must be put to rest.
(2) Limit presidential powers while expanding the role of Parliament
and other legislative organs. Strengthen Parliament by giving it
powers to regulate appointments to public offices, and government
expenditure, and so forth. In this way, the loss of an election will
not diminish a political party's influence in political decision-
making.
(3) Expand the Bill of rights so that group rights are protected just as
much as individual rights are.
(4) Expand the areas of political participation. Strengthen democratic
procedures at the Local government level as well in provincial
councils (if created).
(5) Strengthen the judiciary so that it is capable of resolving conflicts
and punishing deviants.
It should not be expected that the constitution will be a straightjacket
for all events for all times. According to Justice William Rehnquist, the
framers of the U.S. Constitution set out general principles and "left to
succeeding generations the task of applying that language to the unceas-
ingly changing environment."39 However, the process of constitutional
review should spur legislative response to other sectoral concerns. Specific
themes such as land, management of elections, civic education, environ-
ment and the like, could very well be addressed by comprehensive statutes
rather than the constitution. Moreover, by strengthening the judiciary and
especially its judicial review functions, many contentious issues that have
hitherto been an anathema to the exercise of political freedoms may be
resolved.
VI. CONCLUSION
No matter how one views the current political situation, the inevitable
conclusion seems to be that the "big men" of Kenyan politics are indeed
here to stay. The Kenyatta oligarchy gave way to the Kalenjin autocracy.
Both these hegemonies benefited from the ethnic cleavages that were
invented by the colonialists and nurtured so well after independence.
Tormented by the forces of change generated after the cold war, the
Kalenjin autocracy seems to be giving up some of its hold on state centric
349. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693,
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power, while depicting empathy with a more decentralized dispensation.
For now, the nature of the political establishment may be unwieldy, but its
influence on the normative processes is profound. Thus, the current
constitutional review process may romanticize its so-called independence,
but the outcome of its work may be the ultimate judge of this. The hope
that has so far been invested in is enormous. According to professor
Kivutha Kibwana, the process should redesign the entire political, socio
economic and cultural system of the country "so that the basic values,
institutions and rules thus derived have the ability to promote the welfare
of all. ' ,350 This scheme is not compatible with the narrow interests of the
"big men" of Kenyan politics, and there is bound to be conflicts as the
process unfolds.
The fact that ethnicity is at the center of current political develop-
ments, and that it may influence future political outcomes, is not in doubt.
The test is whether Kenyans can live with it. As suggested in this article,
there is need to rethink the notion of ethnicity and explore how to put it to
positive use instead of moaning about its negative aspects. "Positive
ethnicity" offers a favorable basis upon which to launch such an explora-
tion, which is by no means an easy task. If our goal is to attain "democracy
without tears" then relentless we must become in our quest for plausible
and preferable structures of development that will respect our cultures,
religion and race. The extent to which the broad formulations and
aspirations enunciated by positive ethnicity will find expression in the
Kenyan constitution only time will tell. However, one thing remains clear,
unless the ethnic issue is resolved through constitutional change, the only
option left for Kenyans to eliminate political decadence will be through
popular uprising like the Filipinos, Zambians, and Haitians.
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